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Problems and Recommendations 
Security Cooperation in East Asia: 
Structures, Trends and Limitations 
The region of East Asia, encompassing Northeast and 
Southeast Asia as well as China, is currently confronted 
with a plethora of traditional and nontraditional secu-
rity problems: conventional and nuclear armament, 
territorial disputes, historically determined animosi-
ties, resource conflicts, major power rivalries, natural 
catastrophes, piracy and more. China’s economic rise, 
its military modernization and its foreign policy stance 
have led various countries in the Asia-Pacific region to 
perceive it as a threat. Some of them are therefore pur-
suing a strategy of “hedging” vis-à-vis China, usually 
by seeking closer ties with the US. 
East Asia is home to a complex web of partially 
overlapping multilateral forums, the most important 
of which – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) – are formed around the ten 
Southeast Asian countries that have united in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But 
the focus of these platforms lies on nontraditional, 
“soft” security issues. If solely for this reason, the US 
tends to view the regional formats as complementary 
to their own bilateral defense alliances, which con-
tinue to be the real backbone of US security policy in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The EU and its member states, 
in contrast, have so far played only a marginal role in 
the regional mix of alliances, bilateral and trilateral 
security cooperation and multilateral organizations. 
The present study comes to the following conclu-
sions and recommendations: 
 Although they are active in multilateral forums, 
the central actors – the US, China and Japan – prefer 
bilateral forms of security cooperation. In the ear-
ly 2000s, China initiated military exchange with 
countries in and beyond the region, primarily on 
a bilateral level. Under President Obama the US 
announced that it was shifting its focus to Asia and 
would become more involved in regional forums, 
but it has remained committed to its bilateral al-
liances. At the same time, the “allies and friends” 
of the US have intensified their security coopera-
tion with each other. Japan is particularly active in 
this regard. Military contacts between the US and 
China are also being expanded, which can at least 
help to reduce the risk of miscalculation on both 
sides. 
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 China does not automatically perceive bilateral 
and trilateral security cooperation as anti-Chinese 
alliance-building, particularly since China itself 
actively pursues defense diplomacy (albeit without 
alliances). However, Beijing criticizes US alliances 
as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. 
 The US and its partners in the region – above all 
Japan, South Korea and Australia – share an interest 
in supporting the regional cohesion of the ten South-
east Asian countries and the formats affiliated 
with them. By doing so, they hope to prevent those 
ASEAN countries that have territorial disputes with 
China from becoming isolated. The ASEAN member 
states, for their part, are trying to keep both China 
and the US involved in the region in order to avoid 
having to decide between the two. 
 There are signs that Washington’s bilateral alliances 
and security partnerships are being strengthened. 
If the complex conflict situation in the Asia-Pacific 
region narrows down to a struggle between China 
and the US for regional dominance, there is a risk 
that the already relatively weak consensus-based 
security forums of the region could become “hos-
tages” of the major power conflict and continue 
to lose influence. 
 The EU and European countries play virtually no 
role in the hard security issues of the region or in 
the bilateral and trilateral formats. There is, how-
ever, military exchange between individual mem-
ber states – and increasingly the EU itself – and 
partners in East Asia. European countries influence 
the security situation by increasing weapons ex-
ports to the region, albeit without any discernable 
coordination within Europe. 
 The EU should continue to support ASEAN and its 
affiliated organizations – but it should be aware 
of the limitations of these formats when it comes 
to addressing traditional security issues. If the EU 
aspires to be accepted as a member of the East Asia 
Summit, as it has declared, then it must at the very 
least demonstrate continuous high-level political 
commitment, which so far has not been consistently 
the case. 
 While the EU and member states should make clear 
what interests they share with the US (such as free-
dom of navigation), they should also enhance their 
own profile. Particularly, they must credibly cam-
paign for solutions based on international law. If 
the EU sides with Washington too vigorously or even 
unreservedly, it will reach only parts of the region. 
As unlikely as a violent escalation of conflict in the 
East or South China Seas may seem – nevertheless, 
the EU and its member states must be prepared 
for it. They should therefore run through possible 
responses to such a situation. In general, while the 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region resent being 
lectured by the EU, offers of practical cooperation 
are welcomed. 
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(In)Security in East Asia 
 
Security Challenges 
The territorial conflicts in the South and East China 
Seas, which have flared up again since 2008, consti-
tute only one small part of the security challenges 
facing East Asia.1 The whole spectrum of traditional 
and nontraditional security problems can be found 
here: nuclear proliferation (North Korea), convention-
al arms build-up (nearly all regional countries), cross-
border crime, terrorism, pandemics, natural catas-
trophes and others. World War II and later military 
conflicts in the region continue to have an effect on 
relations today; some countries have yet to conclude 
peace treaties. This is the case for Russia and Japan 
(World War II) as well as North Korea and the US (Ko-
rean War). The historical roots of discord between 
China and Japan go further back (Chinese-Japanese 
War of 1895); tensions between Japan and South Korea 
stem from Japan’s occupation of Korea following the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1905. 
The current territorial disputes are focused mainly 
on maritime areas or islands, islets and reefs. In the 
past few years, of the region’s acute hot spots – North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile program, territorial con-
flicts in the East and South China Seas, and the dispute 
between Beijing and Taipei over the status of Taiwan  
–, tensions have eased only in the Taiwan question. 
But even here, the progress made is not irreversible 
as long as the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan 
continue to pursue fundamentally divergent goals. 
China is committed to unification with the island, 
while Taiwan wants to maintain its status quo as a 
de facto independent country. 
 
1  The term “East Asia” will be hereafter used to comprise the 
sub-region of Northeast Asia (consisting of North and South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan Island) and Southeast Asia (the ten 
ASEAN member states) as well as China. The study will also 
include to some extent those countries that participate in the 
East Asia Summit, i.e. Australia, New Zealand and India, as 
well as – since 2011 – Russia and the US. 
Security Cooperation: Alliances, 
Organizations and Forums 
While the region is facing a broad range of security 
challenges, it is at the same time home to a complex 
web of bilateral and multilateral security arrange-
ments. In place of one regional mechanism, several 
partially overlapping organizations have emerged in 
East Asia. Some of them deal exclusively with security 
issues; others address additional issues as well. In con-
trast to (Western-)Europe, all of them are character-
ized by weak institutionalization. 
However, the hard “backbone” of security in Pacific 
Asia is provided not by these diverse regional forums 
but by the five bilateral security alliances of the US 
(“hubs and spokes”). In view of the fact that China has 
been growing stronger in the last ten years, including 
in military terms, these alliances seem indispensable, 
which is why they have become closer and more inten-
sive. 
Thanks to its growing economic significance for 
the neighboring countries, which was accompanied 
by a diplomatic “charm offensive”,2 China had 
initially improved its standing in the region after the 
late 1990s. Since 2009, however, Beijing seems to have 
squandered a large part of this political capital again 
by assuming a stance that is perceived as aggressive.3 
Up until the mid-2000s it was widely hoped – 
particularly in Southeast Asia – that by integrating it 
in regional organizations, one could gradually 
“socialize” China. But this optimism has largely 
vanished due to Beijing’s behavior – primarily towards 
smaller neighbors, but also towards Japan. 
  
 
2  The term “charm offensive” was first used by Joshua Kur-
lantzick to describe China’s policy towards Southeast Asia in 
“China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia”, Current History 
(September 2006): 270–76. The same author later published 
the book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming 
the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
3  Western and Chinese attempts to explain Beijing’s behav-
ior – the latter based on interviews conducted in China – are 
presented in Andrew Scobell and Scott Harold, “An ‘Assertive’ 
China? Insights from Interviews”, Asian Security 9, no. 2 (2013): 
111–31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.795549 
(accessed 28 September 2014). 
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Although China acceded to nearly all regional 
organizations between the early 1990s and the mid-
2000s, it remained strictly opposed to any multilater-
alization or internationalization of existing territorial 
disputes. Beijing’s position is that solutions can only 
be brokered bilaterally. That is why those countries 
that have frictions with China – above all Japan and 
the Philippines – are increasingly seeking the backup 
of the US and support of other partners in and beyond 
the region. 
The US also participates in the regional forums 
that emerged in the 1990s. But compared with its mili-
tary alliances, it attaches far less significance to these 
forums as they wield little authority. Immediately fol-
lowing the inauguration of President Obama in 2009, 
however, the US government resumed and increased 
its activity in the regional forums. Since 2011 there is 
no regional format in East Asia in which the US is not 
represented. Thus, the agenda of the regional organi-
zations may be eclipsed by the power rivalry between 
the major actors, Washington and Beijing. Smaller 
countries of the region may also be more prepared to 
openly address their conflicts with China. 
Regional Implications of the Chinese-US 
Major Power Rivalry 
Under President Obama, the US has announced a 
policy of pivoting or rebalancing towards Asia. Washing-
ton has been supporting this pivot through diplomatic 
and economic initiatives. Security issues in Asia – from 
Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia to South Asia – are 
increasingly seen as part of a competition between, on 
the one hand, the US as the traditionally predominant 
military power; on the other hand, China, which is on 
the rise both economically and militarily. 
In China’s view, the US is the actor that stands in 
the way of its ability to sustainably improve and en-
hance its own position, because the US backing of 
small neighboring countries such as Vietnam or the 
Philippines provides them with room for maneuver 
that they otherwise would not have. The US empha-
sizes its neutrality in maritime territorial disputes 
such as that between China and Japan over the Sen-
kaku Islands (Jap.) or Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands (Chin./ 
Taiw.) in the East China Sea. At the same time, how-
ever, Washington has declared that the disputed 
islands fall under the Japan-US Security Treaty, as they 
are de facto controlled by Japan. China’s vast maritime 
claims are perceived by the US as a challenge to the 
freedom of navigation, while China’s military and 
paramilitary activities in the East and South China 
Seas are seen as aggression towards its neighbors. 
China, through its military modernization programs, 
is in the American view pursuing the goal of limiting 
US access to the region and its room for maneuver 
(termed by Washington as “anti-access/area denial” 
or “A2/AD”). 
The ten ASEAN countries4 have a prime interest in 
avoiding having to decide between the US and China. 
But the aggravation of the maritime and territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea makes this difficult. 
As the regional conflicts do not affect all the ASEAN 
countries, it is not an easy task for the organization 
to formulate a unified position on China – a problem 
that goes all the way back to the 1990s. And Beijing 
has absolutely no interest in ASEAN coming to such 
a common position. The recent developments in the 
security situation add to the challenge the regional 
organizations are facing – and above all to ASEAN’s 
“centrality”: Enhanced US involvement in the regional 
formats under Obama and the context of the pivot are 
viewed by Beijing primarily as components of a con-
tainment policy directed against China. 
There are signs that US bilateral alliances and secu-
rity partnerships are being strengthened. If the com-
plex conflict situation in the Asia-Pacific region nar-
rows down to a struggle between China and the US for 
regional dominance, there is a risk that the already 
relatively weak consensus-based security forums of the 
region could become “hostages” of the major power 
conflict and continue to lose influence. This would 
particularly be true if the ten Southeast Asian coun-
tries united in ASEAN, around which the majority of 
the regional organizations have formed, allow them-
selves to be divided, thereby losing cohesion and 
solidarity. 
In the following, the existing security arrangements 
in the Asia-Pacific region will be presented5 and their 
 
4  Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 
5  The present study thus complements various SWP research 
papers. On Russia as an actor in the Asia-Pacific region see 
Margarete Klein, Russland als euro-pazifische Macht. Ziele, Strate-
gien und Perspektiven russischer Ostasienpolitik, SWP-Studie 12/ 
2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2014). 
On security cooperation in South Asia see Christian Wagner, 
Security Cooperation in South Asia: Overview, Reasons, Prospects, SWP 
Research Paper 2014/RP 06 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, June 2014). And on Japan’s security strategy under 
Abe see Alexandra Sakaki, Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift in Direc-
Regional Implications of the Chinese-US Major Power Rivalry 
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capacities and prospects examined, focusing on devel-
opments since 2008 (when the global financial crisis 
began and Barack Obama was elected US President). 
The first part addresses the US, Japan and China; the 
second on regional organizations and the respective 
roles played by China and the US. Security relations 
among the countries originally represented in the 
East Asia Summit,6 the agenda of the regional organi-
zations, and new trends such as linkages among the 
“spokes”, increased bilateral, trilateral and minilateral 
cooperation, and the intensification of military diplo-
macy will be investigated. To date, there has been no 
such systematic overview of security cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific region, though numerous studies ad-
dress individual formats. The limited role played by 
Europe in the security arrangements is also discussed. 
 
 
 
tion under Abe?, SWP Research Paper 2015/RP 02 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015). 
6  These include the ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. These coun-
tries came together in 2005 for a first summit. In 2011 the 
US and Russia also officially became members of the EAS. For 
a chronology and principal EAS documents see http://www. 
asean.org/asean/external-relations/east-asia-summit-eas 
(accessed 25 July 2014). 
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Bilateralism (plus): US, Japan and China 
 
Unlike in Europe, in the Asia-Pacific region there was 
no serious attempt after World War II to forge a col-
lective security architecture like NATO7 or establish 
a process comparable with the CSCE/OSCE – though 
countries such as Japan and South Korea, which have 
the status of OSCE partners, would doubtless welcome 
such a mechanism in the region, or at least in North-
east Asia. The existing regional organizations, which 
have for the most part formed around the Southeast 
Asian conglomerate of countries, ASEAN, serve as dis-
cussion forums. Like ASEAN itself, they are based on 
the consensus principle and wield little authority. So 
far initiatives aimed at establishing a deeper East 
Asian community have not been particularly well 
received in the region. 
The US and Its “Allies and Friends” 
For the past six decades, US bilateral partnerships 
have constituted the hard security infrastructure in 
East Asia. Washington maintains formal alliances with 
five Asian countries, though these vary in scope and 
intensity. The system of these bilateral alliances is 
termed “hub and spokes” – with the US as the central 
element and its connections to Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, the Philippines and Thailand radiating out-
wards. The US also maintains a military bases in the 
Asia-Pacific region, including on the island of Guam 
(one of the unincorporated territories of the US), and 
security relations with regional countries such as 
Taiwan or Singapore that are tantamount to alliances. 
Since 2005 there has been a series of initiatives 
aimed at building or intensifying security cooperation 
among the “spokes” (called “cross-struts”) or with 
other partners of Washington – commonly referred 
 
7  With the anti-Communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation (SEATO) of 1954, an equivalent to NATO in Southeast 
Asia was founded. But SEATO did not provide for collective 
defense and consisted partially of countries from outside the 
region, while important regional countries were missing. In 
addition to Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East 
Pakistan, today Bangladesh), the Philippines and Thailand, 
France, the UK and the US were also members. The organiza-
tion was dissolved in 1977 due to dwindling interest. 
to as “US allies and friends”. Two motives can be dis-
cerned behind these efforts. First, the US expects its 
allies to assume greater responsibility, particularly in 
the wake of the financial crisis. Second, in light of the 
fiscal and domestic situation in the US, there is some 
degree of uncertainty among the latter as to how sus-
tainable and reliable US commitment to the region 
will be in future. At the core of the US security archi-
tecture in East Asia are Washington’s alliances with 
Japan, South Korea and Australia. (Regarding these 
three central alliances, see also the overview in Table 
1 of the Appendix, p. Fehler! Textmarke nicht 
definiert. et seq.). 
US-Japan 
Down to the present day, the security alliance with 
Japan remains the declared “cornerstone” of US 
alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. In the eyes of those 
countries of the region that see themselves as victims 
of Japanese aggression during World War II – includ-
ing China – this alliance has undoubtedly contributed 
to stabilizing East Asia by preventing Japan from poten-
tially remilitarizing or even acquiring nuclear weap-
ons. As Japan has restricted its military activities to 
pure self-defense in Article 9 of its constitution, the 
security agreement was asymmetric from the very 
start: The US committed itself to the defense of its 
alliance partner and incorporated it under its nuclear 
umbrella (extended nuclear deterrence), while Japan was 
in effect forced to circumvent an article of its own 
constitution in order to support the US militarily in 
their wars. 
In the past two decades, however, the situation has 
gradually changed. While Japan’s involvement in the 
first Gulf War of 1991 was limited to financial contri-
butions,8 in the war in Afghanistan (from 2002) and 
the second Gulf War in 2003 it at least provided logis-
tical and technical support (non-combat and humanitar-
 
8  See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, “Japan Revisits the Gulf War”, 
theguardian.com, 20 September 2001, http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2001/sep/20/worlddispatch.afghanistan (accessed 
11 December 2014). 
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ian support). This more active security role was made 
possible in each case by a parliamentary decision. 
Since Shinzo Abe reassumed the office of Prime Minis-
ter in 2012 – after a first term of office in 2006/2007 – 
the push to “normalize” Japanese defense policy has 
once again gained momentum.9 
Military cooperation between Japan and the US is 
extensive and comprises not only joint maneuvers and 
the exchange of technology and information. Japan 
also plays an integral role in the development of US 
missile defense systems.10 
During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the US in April 
2015, new guidelines for defense cooperation between 
the two countries were released.11 The guidelines are 
designed to guarantee “seamless, robust, flexible, and 
effective” bilateral responses. For this purpose, a stand-
ing Alliance Coordination Mechanism was established. 
Areas in which cooperation will be expanded include 
maritime security, cyberspace and outer space.12 For 
the first time, the guidelines include cooperation in 
the case of an armed attack against a third country – 
though Japan would not participate in combat or 
offensive operations. Moreover, the two allies plan to 
work together closely in regional and global affairs.13 
In order to implement the new guidelines, Japan 
must amend several domestic laws in accordance with 
the changes to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution 
enacted by Japan’s Cabinet in July 2014.14 (This is the 
 
9  Regarding the most recent developments in Japanese 
security policy, see Sakaki, Japan’s Security Policy (see note 5). 
10  For an in-depth study of this issue, see Ian I. Rinehart, 
Steven A. Hildreth and Susan V. Lawrence, Ballistic Missile 
Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, CRS 
Report for Congress R43116 (Washington, D.C., June 2013), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf (accessed 31 October 
2014). 
11  Full text: “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Coopera-
tion”, 27 April 2015, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_-
-_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION_FINAL& 
CLEAN.pdf> (accessed 8 May 2015). 
12  See Yuki Tatsumi, “4 Takeaways From the New US-Japan 
Defense Guidelines”, The Diplomat, 29 April 2015, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2015/04/4-takeaways-from-the-new-us-japan-
defense-guidelines/ (accessed 8 May 2015) 
13  See Jeffrey W. Hornung, “U.S.-Japan: A Pacific Alliance 
Transformed”, The Diplomat, 4 May 2015, http://thediplomat. 
com/2015/05/u-s-japan-a-pacific-alliance-transformed/ 
(accessed 8 May 2015). 
14  The Cabinet decided that Japan could exercise the right 
of collective self-defense, but only if the threat caused by an 
attack on another country with close relations to Japan 
“threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fun-
damentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit 
of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means 
article prohibiting Japan from maintaining armed 
forces or exercising collective self-defense.) 
Until a few years ago, Japan consistently cited 
North Korea and its nuclear program as the main 
threat to its own security in its official security docu-
ments.15 China’s armament efforts, in contrast, were 
primarily criticized as lacking in transparency.16 But 
since 2011, China’s military build-up has been explic-
itly addressed as a reason for concern in Japan’s 
National Defense Program Guidelines17 and Ministry 
of Defense White Papers. The aggravation of the terri-
torial conflict with China in the East China Sea since 
2010/2011 is very likely to have contributed substan-
tially to this development. 
That is why Japan has recently redoubled its efforts 
to establish security cooperation with other countries 
in the region. (For details see p. 18 et seq.) 
US-South Korea 
Given the division of Korea, the primary purpose of 
the US-South Korean alliance is to protect South Korea 
from North Korea. Political frictions between South 
Korea and the US intermittently arise due to the diver-
gent strategies for dealing with North Korea. 
In contrast to other alliance partners in the Pacific, 
Japan and South Korea have in effect had their sover-
eignty curtailed as a result of World War II and the 
Korean War, respectively. In the event of war, South 
Korea's armed forces remain under US operational 
 
available to repel the attack, ensure Japan’s survival and pro-
tect its people”. See full text of the Cabinet decision: “Cabinet 
Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to 
Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” (Provisional 
Translation), July 1, 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/ 
decisions/2014/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.
pdf (accessed 8 May 2015). For a short analysis of the decision 
see Kazuhiko Togo, “Revision of Article 9 and Its Implica-
tions”, PacNet no. 70 (2 September 2014), http://csis.org/ 
publication/pacnet-70-revision-article-9-and-its-implications 
(accessed 8 May 2015). 
15  Sakaki, Japan’s Security Policy (see note 5). 
16  See, e.g., the section on China in Defense of Japan 2008 
(Annual White Paper), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ 
2008.html (accessed 22 August 2013). Japan’s defense white 
papers have been published in full online since 2005 under 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html. 
17  For the complete text, see: [Japan Ministry of Defense], 
National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 
approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on Decem-
ber 17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/ 
guidelines FY2011.pdf (accessed 22 August 2013). 
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control. During his visit to South Korea in April 2014, 
President Obama agreed to continue this arrangement 
instead of allowing it to expire in December 2015 as 
originally planned.18 
The frosty relations between Tokyo and Seoul con-
stitute a problem for the US. Washington would prefer 
the two alliance partners to find common ground and 
increase their bilateral security cooperation.19 There 
are two main obstacles to improved Japanese-Korean 
relations. On the one hand, Tokyo and Seoul are en-
gaged in a territorial dispute over the small island of 
Dokdo (Kor.) or Takeshima (Jap.), which is controlled 
by South Korea. At the same time, Japan’s perceived 
failure to conduct a critical assessment of its role in 
World War II (in the eyes of South Korea as well as 
China) regularly leads to political tensions.20 Closer 
security cooperation between South Korea and Japan 
was already underway. But in 2012, an already nego-
tiated agreement on the exchange of military infor-
mation met with domestic resistance in South Korea 
and in the end was not signed.21 As a result of their 
political frictions, Japan and South Korea do not con-
duct military maneuvers bilaterally but only trilater-
ally, together with the US. 
When US Vice President Joe Biden visited South 
Korea in December 2013, he expressed to President 
Park Geun Hye his hope that Japanese-Korean rela-
tions would take a turn for the better.22 But in late 
December 2013 Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasu-
kuni Shrine, a memorial to the country’s fallen troops, 
including several convicted war criminals. He was the 
first Japanese prime minister to visit the shrine since 
 
18  See “Asians Got More from the American President Than 
He Got from Them”, The Economist, 3 May 2014. 
19  See Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, “A Growing 
Chill between South Korea and Japan Creates Problems for 
the U.S.”, The New York Times, 23 November 2013, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/a-growing-chill-between-
south-korea-and-japan-creates-problems-for-the-us.html?_r=0 
(accessed 6 February 2014). 
20  This is above all linked to remarks made by Japanese 
politicians on the “comfort women”, who – most of them 
from Korea – were forced into prostitution during the war, 
euphemistic depictions of World War II in Japanese school-
books, and visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni 
Shrine in Tokyo. 
21  See Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Postpones Military 
Pact with Japan”, The New York Times, 29 June 2012. 
22  See “Biden Hopes for Improvement in S. Korea-Japan 
Relations”, GlobalPost, 6 December 2013, http://www. 
globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/ 
131206/biden-hopes-improvement-s-korea-japan-relations 
(accessed 6 February 2014). 
2006. The incident caused new outrage in Seoul.23 The 
US, which wants Japan to play a larger security role, is 
faced here with a twofold dilemma. On the one hand, 
the US supports Japan’s military “normalization” but 
opposes Abe’s nationalist agenda. At the same time, 
Washington must distance itself from this agenda with-
out creating a division with Japan that China could 
use to its own advantage.24 
US-Australia 
In contrast to Japan and South Korea, where the 
alliance with the US and the stationing of US troops 
have often met with domestic opposition, in Australia 
the close relationship with the US has never been 
seriously called into question. As far as the security 
situation is concerned, the end of the Cold War did 
not constitute a decisive turning point as it did for 
Europe. Australia has sent troops to every war waged 
by the US in recent decades, from the Korean War 
(1950–1953)25 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Australia 
also actively supported the US-led air strikes against 
the “Islamic State” in 2014.26 
Since US foreign policy under President Obama 
shifted its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, relations 
with Australia have also intensified. When Obama 
visited the country in 2011, he announced that he 
would increase the number of US marines stationed in 
 
23  See, e.g., “Abe’s Yasukuni Visit to Have Diplomatic Reper-
cussions: Seoul”, Yonhap News Agency, 26 December 2014, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/26/11/ 
0301000000AEN20131226004700315F.html (accessed 4 Feb-
ruary 2014). During his visit to Tokyo in early December 
2013, US Vice President Biden apparently understood the 
Japanese Prime Minister to have said that he did not intend 
to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and subsequently conveyed this 
to President Park in Seoul. See Peter Ennis, “Kerry, Kishida 
Emphasize Alliance, Sidestep Simmering Tensions”, The 
Dispatch (Japan), 9 February 2014, http://www.dispatchjapan. 
com/blog/2014/02/kerry-kishida-emphasize-alliance-sidestep-
simmering-tensions.html (accessed 11 February 2014). 
24  Ennis, “Kerry, Kishida Emphasize Alliance” (see note 23). 
25  On Australia’s participation in the Korean War, see: 
“Australia’s Involvement in the Korean War”, http://korean-
war.commemoration.gov.au/ (accessed 15 August 2013). 
26  See “Australian Government Approves Air Strikes Target-
ing Islamic State in Iraq”, theguardian.com, 3 October 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/03/ 
australian-government-approves-air-strikes-targeting-islamic-
state-in-iraq (accessed 30 October 2014). 
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Darwin for training purposes from 250 to 2,500 
men.27 
US-Philippines / US-Thailand 
Washington’s alliances with the Philippines and Thai-
land are less significant than the alliances with Japan, 
South Korea and Australia. The Philippines granted 
the US the right to station troops as early as 1947 
(with two main military bases: Subic Bay Naval Base 
and Clark Air Base). A bilateral defense treaty was con-
cluded in 1951. In 1992, however, the US was forced 
to abandon the bases when the negotiated extension 
of US presence foundered on domestic resistance in 
the Philippines. After the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001, the security cooperation between the 
two countries was revitalized, initially focusing on 
fighting terrorism in the Philippines. 
Manila’s cooperation with the US was given a boost 
in 2011, when the Chinese-Philippine conflict in the 
South China Sea, which had already flared up in 
the 1990s,28 again became virulent. During a visit to 
the Philippines in 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and her Philippine counterpart signed the 
“Manila Declaration”, affirming the two countries’ 
commitment to the security alliance.29 In response 
to China’s actions in the South China Sea, the US 
expanded its weapons deliveries to the Philippines 
and reinforced its military presence in the region.30 
 
27  See, e.g., Ben Packham, “2500 Marines on Australian Soil 
to Increase Defence Ties”, The Australian, 17 November 2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-
australia/us-president-touches-down-at-fairbairn-airforce-
base/story-fnb0o39u-1226197111255 (accessed 15 August 
2013). 
28  See, e.g., Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: 
China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (1999): 95–118. 
29  Full text of the declaration: US Department of State, “Sign-
ing of the Manila Declaration on Board the USS Fitzgerald in 
Manila Bay, Manila, Philippines”, 16 November 2011, http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177226.htm (accessed 22 
August 2013). On cooperation with the Philippines, see also 
“The U.S.-Philippines Alliance: Deepening the Security and 
Trade Partnership”, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade (Washington, D.C., 
7 February 2012), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/02/ 
183494.htm (accessed 22 August 2013). 
30  See Luke Hunt, “U.S. Increasing Military Presence in the 
Philippines”, The Diplomat, 18 December 2012. 
Furthermore, the US at least considered installing part 
of its regional missile defense system in the Philip-
pines.31 During Obama’s visit to Manila in April 2014 
a ten-year defense agreement was concluded, making 
it possible to rotate US ships and aircraft, store equip-
ment and munitions, and conduct joint military exer-
cises.32 A few days after Obama’s departure, the US 
and the Philippines conducted such a joint maneuver. 
Nevertheless, Washington has so far avoided providing 
direct support to the Philippines in the territorial 
disputes with China (most recently over the Scarbor-
oughShoal).33 
The US alliance with Thailand was established in 
1954 by the subsequently dissolved SEATO. In the last 
decade, it tended to be only marginally active, par-
tially due to the domestic upheaval in Thailand. In 
2004 the US had declared the country an “important 
non-NATO ally”. But there is no common perceived 
threat to drive the alliance. In any case, Thailand also 
maintains very robust political and economic rela-
tions with China.34 
US cooperation with Thailand is centered primarily 
on disaster relief.35 This cooperation is also highlight-
ed in the “2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-US 
Defense Alliance”.36 After the devastating tsunami in 
2004 and the cyclone in Myanmar in 2008, Thailand 
served the US, among other things, as a base for its air 
and sea relief operations.37 
 
31  See Li Bin, “China and the New U.S. Missile Defense in 
East Asia”, Proliferation Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 
6 September 2012). 
32  “Manila, U.S. Inpact [sic!] on Defense”, The Washington Post, 
28 April 2014, A10. 
33  See on the vagueness of US support for the Philippines in 
the South China Sea: Renato Cruz De Castro, “Future Chal-
lenges in the US-Philippines Alliance”, International Relations 
and Security Network (ISN), 3 July 2012, http://www.isn.ethz. 
ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=144535 (accessed 22 Au-
gust 2013). 
34  See Julius Cesar I. Trajano, “US Alliances with the Philip-
pines and Thailand: Partnerships of Interests? – Analysis”, 
RSIS Eurasia Newsletter, 22 August 2013. 
35  “US President Barack Obama’s Speech to Parliament”, 
The Australian, 17 November 2011, http://www.theaustralian. 
com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-
parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237 (accessed 15 Au-
gust 2013). 
36  Full text: US Department of Defense, “2012 Joint Vision 
Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance: A 21st Century 
Security Partnership”, 15 November 2012 (no. 904-12), http:// 
www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15685 
(accessed 21 November 2013). 
37  See Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven, Thailand: Back-
ground and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, RL32593 
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Other US Bilateral Security Cooperation 
The five formal US alliances are complemented by a 
series of other military relationships with regional 
countries and security arrangements below the thresh-
old of alliances. They comprise, for example, conduct-
ing joint exercises, sharing military bases, or supply-
ing and repairing combat vessels. Though they are not 
formal alliances, some of these partnerships – Taiwan 
and Singapore deserve special mention – are more im-
portant and of greater consequence than, for example, 
the US alliance with Thailand. 
Taiwan is in effect an ally of Washington, although 
there have been no official diplomatic relations be-
tween the two since 1979. After the US had diplomati-
cally recognized the People’s Republic of China, it 
committed itself in the “Taiwan Relations Act” to help-
ing Taiwan (or the Republic of China) defend itself.38 
This is accomplished primarily by delivering weapons 
to the island state – a practice which is sharply criti-
cized by China. In the US publication Foreign Affairs, 
a debate was initiated in 2011 over whether the US 
should give up its support of Taiwan in order to sus-
tainably improve relations with China. But there was 
little support for the idea among China experts and 
politicians in the US.39 
The US has maintained close security and military 
cooperation with Singapore since the 1960s. In 2003 
Washington offered to classify the city-state as an 
“important non-NATO ally”, but Singapore declined. 
Nevertheless, the security cooperation is extensive. 
It comprises, inter alia, the provision of US ships in 
Singapore and – since 1975 – joint maneuvers. In 
1990/1991, the city-state expanded the possibilities for 
US armed forces to use its territory as a base. In 2000 
the defense ministries of the two countries concluded 
a first “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement”, 
which governs mutual support in areas such as food, 
fuel, transport, munitions, and equipment. In 2005 
the US and Singapore signed an (unpublished) “Stra-
tegic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation 
Partnership in Defence and Security” (SFA), which 
 
(Washington, D.C., 5 June 2012), 12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/row/RL32593.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013). 
38  Full text under Taiwan Relations Act, 1 January 1979, Public 
Law 96–8 96th Congress, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-
relations-act.html (accessed 15 August 2013). 
39  The controversial debate was sparked by an Article by 
Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism 
Does not Mean Pessimism”, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011):  
81–91. 
enhanced their cooperation in this field.40 Since then 
they have also been conducting a “strategic security 
dialogue.”41 
In the 1990s, India42 was “discovered” by the US as a 
“natural” (in view of its democratic system of govern-
ment) strategic partner. After the end of the Cold War, 
cooperation was intensified; the first joint maneuvers 
took place in 1992 and 1994. In 1995 the US and India 
signed a document on security cooperation.43 When 
India conducted a nuclear test in June 1998, Washing-
ton initially responded with sanctions. But under the 
presidency of George W. Bush, the partnership begun 
during the Clinton era was taken up again and became 
closer. Eventually, they renewed their security rela-
tions in a ten-year framework agreement in June 
2005.44 With the bilateral nuclear agreement of 2006, 
India’s status as a nuclear power was effectively 
accepted internationally. After Barack Obama assumed 
office in 2009, relations between the US and India 
went through a dry spell but were then revived, in-
cluding the dimension of security cooperation45 – 
although a closing of ranks with the US continues to 
meet with domestic resistance in India. Delhi will 
continue to pursue its own independent foreign policy 
 
40  See Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the US: Not Quite Allies”, 
The Strategist, July 2012, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ 
singapore-and-the-us-not-quite-allies/ (accessed 25 July 2014); 
[IISS], “Singapore and the US: Security Partners, Not Allies”, 
The International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 27 August 
2013, http://isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng= 
en&id=168339 (accessed 6 February 2014). 
41  See Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) Singapore, “Factsheet – 
The Strategic Framework Agreement”, http://www.mindef. 
gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul
05_nr/12jul05_fs.html#.U9IpCJ3wBFo (accessed 25 July 2014). 
42  As India is also a member of the East Asia Summit, it 
is taken into consideration here (in contrast to Pakistan). 
43  “Agreed Minutes on Defence Relations between the 
United States and India”; see also Ashok Sharma, Indo-US Stra-
tegic Convergence: An Overview of Defence and Military Cooperation, 
Kartikeya Paper no. 2, 2008 (Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare 
Studies [CLAWS], 2008), 11 et seq., http://www.claws.in/ 
images/publication_pdf/CLAWS%20Papers%20No%5B1% 
5D.2,%202008.pdf (accessed 11 December 2014). 
44  Full text under “New Framework for the U.S.-India De-
fense Relationship”, 6 July 2005, http://intellibriefs.blogspot. 
de/2005/07/new-framework-for-us-india-defense.html (ac-
cessed 25 July 2014). 
45  See Ashok Sharma, “The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership: 
An Overview of Defense and Nuclear Courtship”, Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs, 4 July 2013, http://journal. 
georgetown.edu/the-u-s-india-strategic-partnership-an-overview- 
of-defense-and-nuclear-courtship-by-ashok-sharma/ (accessed 
25 July 2014). 
The US and Its “Allies and Friends” 
SWP Berlin 
Security Cooperation in East Asia 
May 2015 
 
 
 
17 
and will strive to avoid siding too closely with the 
US against China.46 
Vietnam is in a situation similar to that of the Philip-
pines. It claims part of the South China Sea (more pre-
cisely, the Paracel Islands), over which it is engaged in 
a dispute with China. The rapprochement between 
Vietnam and the US since 2010 – which at first glance 
is surprising given the two countries’ history – must 
also be seen in the context of the resurfacing of dis-
putes between Hanoi and Beijing over maritime areas 
and resource exploration. US-Vietnamese economic 
and security cooperation has increased considerably. 
For example, there are joint search and rescue exer-
cises, and the US has relaxed its weapons embargo 
for non-lethal armaments. But the political system 
and human rights violations in Vietnam continue to 
hinder cooperation.47 
The year 2013 saw a revival of military cooperation 
between the US and New Zealand, which had been sev-
ered 30 years earlier.48 Washington has also renewed 
or intensified military and security cooperation with 
other countries in the region such as Malaysia, Indo-
nesia49 and Brunei. The US conducts security dialogues 
with these countries and/or receives support from 
them, for instance in maintaining US combat vessels. 
The US has also begun expanding airstrips on various 
small Pacific islands, which provide an alternative to 
the larger, more vulnerable military bases on Guam 
or Okinawa.50 
For the respective countries, security cooperation 
with Washington means that they obtain their arma-
ments almost exclusively from the US. This is true not 
only for the formal alliance partners (with the excep-
 
46  See Christian Wagner, “Forging a New Alliance? Die Bezie-
hungen zu Indien und die Zukunft der amerikanischen Welt-
führungspolitik”, in Weltmacht vor neuen Herausforderungen: 
Die Außenpolitik in der Ära Obama, ed. by Steffen Hagemann, 
Wolfgang Tönnesmann and Jürgen Wilzewski (Trier, 2014): 
267–86. 
47  See Joseph Yun, “U.S. Relations with Vietnam”, Testimony, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific, 5 June 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ 
rm/2013/06/210297.htm (accessed 6 February 2014). 
48  See Reissa Su, “New Zealand, U.S. Resume Military Rela-
tions amid China’s Growing Strength in Asia-Pacific”, Inter-
national Business Times, 29 October 2013. 
49  On the renewed partnerships of the US with Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and New Zealand under Obama see also: 
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partner-
ships in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Developments and 
Prospects”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 36, no. 2 (2014): 262–89. 
50  Geoff Dyer, “US Eyes Pacific Islands as Part of Military 
Strategy”, Financial Times, 29 April 2014. 
tion of Thailand) but also, for example, for Singapore 
and Taiwan.51 
Virtually none of the US partners listed above, with 
the possible exception of Japan, is prepared to openly 
pursue a strategy of containment against China. In 
the last decade China has in effect become the largest 
trading partner for all the countries of the region. The 
economic interrelations in the form of regional pro-
duction chains are highly developed, which is why no 
country wishes to be forced to choose between China 
and the US. But a robust US presence continues to be 
welcomed – also as a guarantee or deterrent against a 
potentially belligerent turn in the rise of China. China’s 
increasingly assertive stance, which is often perceived 
as aggressive, has prompted the countries of the region 
to seek Washington’s protection while at the same 
time endeavoring to avoid endangering their political 
and economic relations with China. 
Security Cooperation between the US and 
Multiple Partners 
The US regularly conducts joint military maneuvers 
with various “allies and friends”. One of the largest 
formats is the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise), to 
which the US has been inviting Pacific Rim and other 
countries since 1971.52 In 2012, India and Russia par-
ticipated in the format for the first time, to China’s 
disgruntlement.53 A further multination military exer-
cise – the largest in the world – takes place annually 
under the name of Cobra Gold; in addition to the US, 
participants include Thailand, Singapore, Japan, South 
Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia.54 China itself has begun 
participating in both formats. (For further details, see 
p. 23 et seq.) 
 
51  On the arms imports of the countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region, see the statistics of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
under http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
52  On RIMPAC 2014 see http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/ 
2012/about/ (accessed 22 May 2015). 
53  See Miles Yu, “Inside China: China upset over RIMPAC 
snub”, The Washington Times, 4 July 2012, http://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/4/inside-china-china-
upset-over-rimpac-snub/?page=all (accessed 7 February 2014). 
54  On Cobra Gold 2013 see U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, 
“Multinational Exercise Cobra Gold Set to Begin in Thailand”, 
18 January 2013, http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/News/ 
NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/919/Article/136965/multinational-
exercise-cobra-gold-set-to-begin-in-thailand.aspx (accessed 12 
November 2013). 
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Furthermore, decades ago the US initiated two 
further formats, namely the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium (WPNS), which has brought together the 
commanders of the regional naval forces since 1988, 
and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), 
in which commanding army officers of the Asia-Pacific 
region have been participating since 1978.55 At the 
2014 WPNS in Chinese Qingdao, the participants 
agreed on a – legally nonbinding – maritime agree-
ment (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, CUES) 
designed to regulate communication in unforeseen 
maritime encounters.56 
In 2007 the so-called quadrilateral format was 
established, in the framework of which the US, Japan, 
Australia and India met for a security policy dialogue 
and conducted joint military maneuvers.57 Beijing sus-
pected that the security cooperation among the four 
countries was directed against China and submitted 
formal protests to that effect. The formation was quietly 
dissolved when Australia withdrew from the dialogue 
and the other three countries began to debate whether 
the quadrilateral dialogue provoked China unneces-
sarily.58 
Security cooperation also takes place in a trilateral 
framework. The US, Japan and South Korea regularly 
conduct joint military exercises despite the tense rela-
 
55  See David Capie, “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: 
Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy”, Con-
temporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 1 (2013): 1–26 (8). 
56  See Shannon Tiezzi, “Small But Positive Signs at Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium”, The Diplomat, 24 April 2014, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2014/04/small-but-positive-signs-at-western-
pacific-naval-symposium/ (accessed 4 August 2014). In 2012 
China had still opposed such an arrangement. Nevertheless, 
representatives of the Chinese navy also made clear immedi-
ately following the 2014 agreement that it was voluntary and 
not valid in territorial waters, and that its application was to 
be negotiated bilaterally. See Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, Naval 
Symposium in China: Decoding the Outcome, IDSA Comment (29 
April 2014). 
57  See, e.g., Brahma Chellany, “The Quad: Australia-India-
Japan-U.S. Strategic Cooperation”, Asian Age, 3 July 2007, 
http://chellaney.net/2007/07/02/the-quad-australia-india-japan-
u-s-strategic-cooperation/ (accessed 12 November 2013); Brah-
ma Chellany, “The U.S.-India-Australia-Japan Quadrilateral 
Initiative”, Asian Age, 2 July 2007, http://chellaney.net/2007/ 
06/01/the-u-s-india-japan-australia-quadrilateral-initiative/ 
(accessed 12 November 2013). 
58  On the positions of the individual countries see David 
Brewster, “The Australia-India Security Declaration: The 
Quadrilateral Redux?”, Security Challenges 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–9 
(3 et seq.), http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/ 
vol6no1Brewster.pdf (accessed 31 October 2014). 
tions between Seoul and Tokyo.59 The same is true for 
the US, India and Japan60 as well as the US, Japan and 
Australia.61 In addition, the foreign ministers of the 
latter three states have been meeting regularly in a 
Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) since 2006.62 Exer-
cises in Northeast Asia, in particular, are criticized by 
China (and North Korea). 
At the initiative of the US, in April 2014 then Sec-
retary of Defense Chuck Hagel met with his counter-
parts from all ten ASEAN member states – a first for 
this format (termed US-ASEAN Defense Forum). Topics 
discussed at the informal meetings included humani-
tarian and disaster relief as well as regional security.63 
It remains to be seen whether the forum will become 
a regular event. 
Japanese Initiatives 
In recent years Japan, for its part, has forged ahead 
in intensifying its security cooperation with other US 
partners, building “struts” between the “spokes”. It 
has concluded agreements in military cooperation 
with Australia (2007, 2008, 2010), India (2008 – on 
the exchange of troops, JIMEX joint maneuvers and a 
defense dialogue),64 and most recently the Philippines 
 
59  See, e.g., Kirk Spitzer, “Double-Secret Training for Ameri-
ca’s Feuding Asian Allies”, Time, 17 May 2013, http://nation. 
time.com/2013/05/17/double-secret-training-for-americas-
feuding-asian-allies/ (accessed 4 August 2014); Matthew Pen-
nington, “Uneasy Partners Japan, S. Korea Join U.S. Air Drills”, 
Military Times, 22 August 2013, http://www.militarytimes.com/ 
article/20130822/NEWS/308220015/Uneasy-partners-Japan-S-
Korea-join-U-S-air-drills (accessed 4 August 2014). 
60  See Niharika Manthana, “Japan to Join U.S.-India Military 
Exercises”, The Wall Street Journal, 22 July 2014, http://online. 
wsj.com/articles/japan-to-join-u-s-india-military-exercises-
1406043468 (accessed 4 August 2014). 
61  “Jets Roar over Pacific as US, Japan, Australia Conduct 
Military Drills”, Fox News (online), 7 February 2013, http:// 
www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/07/jets-roar-over-pacific-skies-
as-us-military-gathers-allies-in-drills-to-keep/ (accessed 4 
August 2014). 
62  TSD was founded in 2002; since 2006 meetings have taken 
place at the level of foreign ministers. See J. Berkshire Miller, 
“U.S.-Japan-Australia: A Trilateral with Purpose?”, The Diplomat, 
25 October 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/u-s-japan-
australia-a-trilateral-with-purpose/ (accessed 5 August 2014). 
63  See Carl Thayer, “US-ASEAN Defense Ministers Meet in 
Hawaii”, The Diplomat, 11 April 2014, http://thediplomat.com/ 
2014/04/us-asean-defense-ministers-meet-in-hawaii/ (accessed 
14 April 2014). 
64  On Japanese-Indian cooperation see Rajan Menon, “An 
India-Japan Alliance Brewing?”, The National Interest, 22 Jan-
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(2013). Furthermore, Tokyo has announced plans to 
increase military cooperation with Vietnam (2011) and 
in the area of maritime security in general (2013).65 
After assuming office in December 2012, Shinzo 
Abe notably stepped up his country’s diplomatic activ-
ities. His first journey abroad after the change of gov-
ernment took him to Vietnam, Thailand and Indone-
sia in January 2013.66 Within his first year in office, 
he travelled to all ten ASEAN member states as well 
as India – also with the goal of strengthening the 
respective relations in the field of security. This high-
ranking diplomatic exchange was flanked by Japan’s 
foreign minister and minister of defense. Under Abe, 
Japan has carried out a reorientation of its policy in 
the region – refocusing its attention on security issues 
rather than economic activities. Since 2011, China’s 
territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku Islands in the East China Sea and with Vietnam 
and the Philippines in the South China Sea have once 
again intensified. Under the leadership of Prime Minis-
ter Abe, Japan has responded by relaxing its weapons 
export laws and announcing plans to deliver patrol 
boats to Vietnam and the Philippines.67 
Japan’s “strategic partnership” with the Philip-
pines, which has existed since 2011, was originally 
focused on economic exchange. As a result of the two 
countries’ conflicts with China, however, since 2012/ 
2013 the primary focus has shifted to security coopera-
tion, especially in maritime affairs.68 The Philippines 
has offered not only the US but also Japan access to 
the Subic Bay base. The Philippine foreign minister 
 
uary 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/ 
india-japan-alliance-brewing-9748 (accessed 24 January 2014); 
Harsh V. Pant, “China’s Rise Leads India and Japan to Wary 
Embrace”, YaleGlobal online, 30 January 2014. 
65  See Bhubindhar Singh, “The ADMM-Plus: A View from 
Japan”, in Strategic Engagement in the Asia Pacific: The Future of 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), ed. by 
Sarah Teo and Mushahid Ali, Policy Report (August 2013), 19 
et seq. (20), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
08/PR_Strategic-Engagement-in-the-Asia-Pacific.pdf (accessed 
25 August 2013). 
66  See “Japan Rebalances Its Strategies with Asean Nations”, 
The Nation, 14 January 2013. 
67  See Amando Doronila, “Kishida Visit Shot in the Arm for 
PH”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 January 2013, http://opinion. 
inquirer.net/44847/kishida-visit-shot-in-the-arm-for-ph. On 
Vietnam see Rajaram Panda, “ARF Summit Meeting at Nay-
pyidaw: An Assessment”, IPRIS Viewpoints, no. 151 (August 
2014), 4. 
68  See Julius Cesar I. Trajano, Japan-Philippines Strategic Partner-
ship: Converging Threat Perceptions, RSIS Commentary, no. 146/ 
2013 (5 August 2013). 
has expressed his government’s support for Japan’s 
plans to amend its pacifist-oriented constitution and 
its efforts towards military “normalization”.69 
It even seems possible that Japan might deliver 
weapons to India. In 2008 the two countries issued a 
joint declaration on bilateral security cooperation. 
The defense ministers met (2011) and joint coastguard 
and naval exercises took place (2012). When the newly 
elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan in 
2014, the two countries agreed to intensify their secu-
rity cooperation. A memorandum of understanding 
on defense cooperation and exchange was signed. 
Furthermore, the two sides emphasized the signifi-
cance of so-called 2+2 meetings (between the respec-
tive foreign and defense ministers) and dialogue 
among national security advisors.70 However, India’s 
outsider status in the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
continues to be an irritant between Tokyo and Delhi. 
There are indications that Abe would also like to 
breathe new life into the quadrilateral format com-
prising the US, Japan Australia and India – he refers 
to this configuration as a “security diamond”.71 But it 
remains to be seen whether the other three countries 
are indeed prepared to form such a diamond with 
Japan. 
Enhanced Cooperation among 
Other Countries of the Region 
Japan is not the only country actively pursuing secu-
rity cooperation with partners in the region. Others 
countries, too, are endeavoring to diversify their 
security relations.72 Over the past few years South 
 
69  See David Pilling, Roel Landingin and Jonathan Soble, 
“Philippines Backs Rearming of Japan”, Financial Times, 9 
December 2012; Trajano, Japan-Philippines Strategic Partnership 
(see note 68). 
70  “Modi’s Japan Visit 2014: India, Japan to ‘Upgrade’ 
Defence Cooperation”, The Economic Times, 1 September 2014, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-01/ 
news/53441851_1_defence-cooperation-defence-equipment-
defence-ministers (accessed 9 September 2014). 
71  See the article by the Japanese Prime Minister: Shinzo 
Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Project Syndicate, 
16 January 2013. In this context he also speaks of the “conflu-
ence” of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The “Indo-Pacific” con-
cept is also used by Indonesia and Australia. 
72  For an in-depth analysis of the bilateral relationships 
within Asia see Patrick M. Cronin et al., The Emerging Asia 
Power Web. The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, July 2013), 
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Korea has started to establish such cooperation. Re-
cently it has (again) begun pursuing “middle-power” 
diplomacy towards countries such as India, Australia 
and Canada.73 Seoul was disappointed by China’s 
“neutral” reaction to two incidents involving North 
Korea in 2010 – the sinking of the corvette “Cheonan”, 
allegedly after having been struck by a North Korean 
torpedo, and the bombing of the island of Yeonpyeong 
off the coast of Seoul by the North Korean military. 
These events led to a temporary rapprochement be-
tween South Korea and Japan. But South Korea does 
not seem to feel threatened by China to the same 
extent that Japan does.74 South Korea’s main concern 
is the (conventional) threat posed by North Korea as 
well as its nuclear program. And the solution to this 
problem is only conceivable with the support and par-
ticipation of both the US and China. 
Since the 1990s, India has increasingly been turn-
ing its attention to Southeast Asia. It has also recently 
shown an interest in developing a more robust mari-
time presence in the Pacific. Its “Look East” policy 
(more recently dubbed “Act East”)75 is aimed at estab-
lishing closer ties with the countries of Southeast Asia 
– also in the realm of security. India’s active role in 
regional formats can be attributed to this goal. The 
Philippines, for its part, offered a strategic partnership 
not only to Japan but also to Australia in 2013. 
But all these security cooperation formats remain 
significantly below the threshold of constituting de-
fense alliances. The countries are primarily interested 
in strengthening their own position and securing 
backing for their position,76 preferably without giving 
Beijing the impression of forming a united front 
against China. A second factor motivating regional 
countries is doubtless their awareness that the US 
military will be subject to fiscal constraints in the 
coming years. Thirdly, it is still unclear how sustain-
 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ 
AsiaPowerWeb.pdf (accessed 18 August 2014). 
73  See, e.g., Sukjoon Yoon, “Middle-Power Cooperation 
between South Korea and India: Hedging the Dominance 
of the Great Powers”, PacNet no. 10 (28 January 2014). 
74  For a detailed analysis see Sheryn Lee, “Burying the 
Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea 
Security Cooperation”, Asian Security 9, no. 2 (2013): 93–110. 
75  “Sushma Tells Indian Envoys to ‘Act East’ and Not Just 
‘Look East’”, The Times of India, 26 August 2014, http:// 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Sushma-tells-Indian-
envoys-to-act-east-and-not-just-look-east/articleshow/ 
40931866.cms (accessed 30 October 2014). 
76  See Julio Amador III, “The Philippines’ Search for Stra-
tegic Partners”, The Diplomat, 23 July 2013. 
able the US policy of pivoting or rebalancing to Asia 
will be and how substantially the US will back up its 
rhetoric. In Obama’s second term in office, pivot and 
rebalancing seem to play a much smaller role than 
before,77 and US diplomacy has – by necessity – turned 
its attention once more to developments in the Euro-
pean neighborhood (Syria/Iraq, Middle East conflict, 
Ukraine). 
China’s Defense Diplomacy 
Until the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China had 
supported Communist organizations and rebel move-
ments in other Asian countries, above all in South-
east Asia (Indochina, Burma, Thailand) by providing 
material assistance and training. As its relations with 
the countries of the region increasingly opened and 
normalized, Beijing abandoned this policy. 
China has only one formal alliance partner – North 
Korea. The friendship and defense pact concluded 
in 1961 was never abrogated and continues to be in 
force.78 In addition, China maintains very close rela-
tions with Pakistan, which also includes a military 
dimension.79 But relations with North Korea and Paki-
stan are not free of problems. North Korea is almost 
entirely dependent on Chinese energy and food deliv-
eries but has over the past several decades proved 
resistant to Beijing’s attempts to exert influence over 
the country, for instance with respect to conducting 
nuclear tests. China’s traditional friendship with Paki-
stan is strained by the instability of its South Asian 
neighbor and by terrorist activities in the Chinese 
region of Xinjiang, which borders on Central Asia and 
Pakistan. 
 
77  See, e.g., Shannon Tiezzi, “Has Obama Abandoned 
the Pivot to Asia?”, The Diplomat, 30 January 2014, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2014/01/has-obama-abandoned-the-pivot- 
to-asia/ (accessed 4 February 2014). 
78  Full text of the treaty: Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 11 July 1961, http://www. 
marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm. 
Article II contains the clause on mutual military assistance 
in case of attack. 
79  On China–Pakistan see, e.g., Raffaello Pantucci, “China 
in Pakistan: An Awkward Relationship beneath the Surface”, 
RUSI Newsbrief, 15 January 2014, https://www.rusi.org/ 
downloads/ assets/201401_NB_Pantucci.pdf (accessed 4 
August 2014); Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s 
New Geopolitics (London, 2015). 
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Officially, China pursues a policy of eschewing 
alliances (the treaty with North Korea is usually not 
mentioned). It always emphasizes that its cooperation 
with other countries is not directed against third 
countries. This applies, for example, to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose members 
include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan. Military alliances, such as those 
of the US, are officially attributed to a “Cold War 
mentality” and thus rejected.80 
In the past two decades, however, China has also 
begun to expand military contacts with other coun-
tries, including countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Since 1995 Beijing has published white papers on 
defense,81 which also include a section on “inter-
national security cooperation”. China’s leadership 
apparently came to the realization in the early 2000s 
that the positive aspects of closer military exchange 
with other countries outweigh the negative effects. 
These advantages include trust-building, an increase 
in operative experience, and the opportunity to dem-
onstrate transparency – and thus to counter criticism 
leveled at China in this domain. 
China’s Bilateral Military Diplomacy in the Region 
As early as the end of the Cold War, China improved 
its military relations with several neighboring coun-
tries. Initially Chinese support was directed mainly 
at Myanmar and Cambodia in the form of equipment 
and training. Toward the end of the 1990s, Beijing put 
out feelers to other Southeast Asian countries, among 
them US allies. A series of joint declarations ensued, 
aimed at promoting closer security contacts – with 
Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia in 1999; and 
with Singapore, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam in 2000.82 
The concretization of these arrangements, however, 
has been slow to materialize. In any case, security co-
 
80  See, e.g., Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, “US Military Base 
in Australia Shows ‘Cold War Mentality’”, People’s Daily Online, 
1 December 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/ 
7662091.html (accessed 12 December 2014). 
81  The English versions can be found on the official website 
of the Chinese Defense Ministry, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ 
Database/WhitePapers/index.htm. The first White Paper was 
published in 1995; between 1998 and 2010 it was published 
bi-annually, the latest edition came out in 2013. 
82  For more details on China’s military contacts in the 
region, see Ian Storey: “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy 
in Southeast Asia”, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 287–310. 
operation between China and the countries of South-
east Asia varies in intensity. China regularly exchang-
es military delegations with all the ASEAN member 
states; in addition, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Singapore conduct security dialogues 
with Beijing.83 
As a weapons exporter, so far China has largely 
restricted its weapons deliveries to those neighbors 
that – over an extended period of time or temporarily 
– were barred from other supply sources, such as Myan-
mar under the military regime, Cambodia, Timor-
Leste, Thailand (following the coup d’état in 2006), 
and for a time even the Philippines (2004). 
China did not start conducting joint military ma-
neuvers until 2002, initially with Kyrgyzstan. This 
same year marked the beginning of annual maneuvers 
under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation, in which Russia and Central Asian countries 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) took part in varying con-
stellations. In the maritime sector, too, China has 
begun carrying out joint military exercises with some 
of its neighbors (including even Taiwan), above all in 
the field of disaster relief and “search and rescue” 
missions. At the same time, China has intensified the 
travel diplomacy of its military representatives,84 port 
calls by combat vessels, etc., with the aim of building 
trust. Such measures do not dispel regional concerns 
over Beijing’s long-term ambitions, but they at least 
serve to create greater transparency and establish 
patterns of cooperation. 
Joint maneuvers are also conducted with selected 
ASEAN member states, such as Thailand (2005 – mine 
sweeping, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief, HADR) and Singapore (2009 and 
2010 – counter-terrorism). However, the fact that Thai-
land and Singapore cooperate closely with the US 
in the security sector limits their cooperation with 
China.85 In 2011 and 2012, joint counter-terrorism 
exercises with Indonesia also took place.86 
 
83  Ibid.: 307. 
84  For example, China’s defense minister traveled to India 
in September 2012; around the same time, the deputy chief 
of general staff visited Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, Malaysia 
and Singapore. See Zhan Shengnan and Wang Chenyan, “PLA 
Diplomacy to Ease Tensions”, China Daily, 4 September 2012. 
85  See Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy” (see 
note 82): 302–05. 
86  Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “The U.S. Rebalancing and 
Indonesia’s Strategic Engagement”, in Strategic Engagement in 
the Asia Pacific, ed. by Teo and Ali (see note 65): 17 et seq. (18). 
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Since 2011 China has maintained a Defense Stra-
tegic Dialogue with South Korea. In 2014 the two states 
set up a military hotline, shortly after an official visit 
by China’s new head of state and party leader, Xi Jin-
ping, in South Korea.87 
China and Australia also maintain a Defence Stra-
tegic Dialogue. During the 16th round of these talks in 
January 2014, the two countries concluded an action 
plan (Australia-China Defence Engagement Action 
Plan) that maps out further cooperation in maritime 
issues, a strategic policy dialogue, training exchange 
and joint exercises.88 Annual summit meetings have 
been held since 2003, accompanied by a foreign policy 
and strategy dialogue between the two countries’ 
foreign ministers.89 Joint bilateral and trilateral mili-
tary maneuvers in the region are planned (together 
with the US).90 
In 2008 China and Japan had agreed to pursue 
joint oil and gas exploration in the East China Sea,91 
but there was no follow-up to this political agreement. 
The establishment of a direct communication line for 
emergency situations, over which Tokyo and Beijing 
have repeatedly negotiated (most recently in 2012), 
has yet to materialize.92 In late 2011 the two countries 
agreed to establish a high-level dialogue on maritime 
affairs involving the foreign and defense ministers as 
 
87  See Ankit Panda, “China, South Korea Establish Military 
Hotline”, The Diplomat, 25 July 2014. 
88  “China, Australia Strike Agreement on Defence Action 
Plan”, SBS News, 15 January 2014, http://www.sbs.com.au/ 
news/article/2014/01/15/china-australia-strike-agreement-
defence-action-plan (accessed 5 February 2014). 
89  Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, “People’s Republic of China Country Brief”, http:// 
www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china_brief.html (accessed 22 
August 2014). 
90  See Rory Medcalf, “Can Military Diplomacy Keep the Peace 
in 2013?”, The Diplomat, 5 January 2013. After the transition 
of power in Australia 2013, the new government under Tony 
Abbott took up these ideas, see Philip Wen and Mark Kenny, 
“Chinese Troops Could Train in Australia”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 April 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/ 
political-news/chinese-troops-could-train-in-australia-20140412-
36jsx.html (accessed 22 August 2014). 
91  For the contents of the agreement, see “China, Japan 
Reach Principled Consensus on East China Sea Issue”, Xinhua-
wang, 18 June 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
06/18/content_8394206.htm (accessed 30 September 2014). 
92  On the issue of a hotline see also the report of the Inter-
national Crisis Group Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations 
on the Rocks, Asia Report no. 245 (Brussels, 8 April 2013), 31 et 
seq., http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-
asia/245-dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-on-the-
rocks.pdf (accessed 30 September 2014). 
well as various other authorities. An initial meeting 
took place in May 2012,93 but due to the ensuing ten-
sions the format was suspended (the Japanese govern-
ment had bought three of the five disputed Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands, which had previously been privately 
owned). In September 2014 maritime talks were 
resumed, which could indicate that both sides are in-
terested in a de-escalation of the territorial conflict.94 
And in official statements published by Tokyo and 
Beijing shortly before the APEC summit in November 
2014, both parties at least admitted that they had 
differences.95 It remains to be seen whether these 
developments lead to rapprochement and sustainable 
crisis management. 
Relations between China and India also remain 
ambivalent. In 1962 the two countries fought a war, 
which was resolved in China’s favor. While China 
sorted out its national land borders with all other im-
mediately neighboring countries in the 1990s, the 
border issue with India has yet to be resolved. In 1993 
the two countries only agreed to maintain peace along 
the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to imple-
ment confidence-building measures aimed at imple-
menting this agreement. Indeed, there has been no 
escalation along the border, although Chinese armed 
forces repeatedly encroached on Indian territory.96 
Since 2007 the two sides have been meeting regularly 
to conduct a defense dialogue, and several joint maneu-
vers have been conducted.97 China and Taiwan, too, 
 
93  See Taylor Fravel, “Japan, China’s Maritime Step”, The 
Diplomat, 19 May 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/japan-
chinas-maritime-step/ (accessed 30 September 2014). 
94  See Shannon Tiezzi, “The Latest Sign of a China-Japan 
Thaw”, The Diplomat, 25 September 2014, http://thediplomat. 
com/2014/09/the-latest-sign-of-a-china-japan-thaw/ (accessed 
30 September 2014). 
95  See Yuka Hayashi, “Who Gave Ground? China, Japan 
Tweak Translations to Claim Victory”, The Wall Street Journal, 
9 November 2014. The text of the two declarations differs in 
the originals (Chinese and Japanese) as well as in the English 
translation. 
96  See Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “Sino-Indian Defense Dia-
logue: A Panacea for the Sino-Indian Security Dilemma?”, 
China Brief (Jamestown Foundation) 13, no. 6 (2013): 10–13. 
Such a border incident also overshadowed the first visit of 
Chinese President Xi Jinping to India’s new Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi, in September 2014. See Abhaya Srivastava, 
“China Troops Withdraw from India Border”, BusinessInsider, 
19 September 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-
china-troops-withdraw-from-india-border-as-xi-visit-ends-2014-9 
(accessed 30 October 2014). 
97  See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to 
Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, 29, 
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have carried out joint maneuvers in recent years, 
though they have been limited to search and rescue 
operations.98 China would like to engage in more 
military exchange with the island, but there are 
reservations on the side of Taiwan. 
China’s Military-to-Military Contacts with the US 
Despite their mutual “strategic distrust”,99 the US and 
China have resumed contacts and exchange in the 
military sector in 1993, after Washington had put a 
stop to such relations in 1989 in reaction to the Tian-
anmen massacre.100 But this area of US-Chinese co-
operation has been relatively limited in scope, at least 
compared with their close economic and financial 
relations. Incidents have also regularly caused set-
backs. In 1995/1996 there was a crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait – China reacted to Taiwan’s first free elections 
by staging missile tests near the island. The US 
responded by deploying two aircraft carrier battle 
groups to the Strait. In 1999, during the Kosovo War, 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by 
NATO forces. Two years later a Chinese fighter plane 
collided with a US reconnaissance aircraft. The Chi-
nese plane crashed, and the US plane was forced to 
make an emergency landing on the island of Hainan. 
These events and a series of incidents at sea demon-
strate how crisis-prone the military relationship be-
tween the two countries is.101 Mutual recriminations 
of cyber espionage and preparing for cyber warfare 
are a further source of friction. 
In the past Beijing promptly reacted to every crisis 
in US-Chinese relations by suspending military dia-
 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/china_military_power_ 
report_2009.pdf (accessed 11 August 2014). 
98  For example in August 2014, see “Taiwan, China Conduct 
Joint Maritime Rescue Drill in Taiwan Strait”, CAN (online), 
7 August 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/2014080700 
25.aspx (accessed 12 December 2014). 
99  This expression describes the distrust the US and China 
have of each other with respect to long-term intentions. See 
in detail Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-
China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Mono-
graph Series 4 (2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china%20lieberthal/
0330_china_lieberthal.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
100  In the 1980s the US even sold weapons to China. 
101  For details on the military contacts see Shirley A. Kan, 
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress RL 32496 (Washington. D.C., 20 November 2011), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf (accessed 
4 February 2014). 
logues and scheduled visits, for example when the 
US – as in 2010 – announced arms sales to Taiwan.102 
In January 2012, China’s then head of state and party 
leader, Hu Jintao, ultimately agreed to invigorate and 
bolster military exchange with the US.103 His succes-
sor, Xi Jinping, also underscored China’s willingness 
to more robust cooperation in this area. Such decla-
rations of intent at the highest political level have in 
fact helped to stabilize exchange. Since 2012 there has 
been a noticeably high frequency of visits and return 
visits by high-ranking military staff on both sides. 
Various dialogue formats facilitate a relatively 
regular exchange of ideas between military represent-
atives of the two sides. Three of these forums were 
given particular mention in the joint declaration that 
followed the meeting between Barack Obama and Hu 
Jintao in 2012: the Defense Consultative Talks (which 
have existed since as early as 1997 and which took 
place for the fourteenth time in 2013), the Defense 
Policy Coordination Talks (since 2006), and the Mili-
tary Maritime Consultative Agreement, which focuses 
on safety at sea (since 1989 with interruptions).104 
Since 2011 the US and China have also been engaged 
in a Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD), which brings 
together high-ranking civilian and military officials 
within the framework of the US-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue.105 In early 2014 the two countries 
agreed to establish a dialogue between the land forces; 
 
102  A list of US weapons deliveries to Taiwan can be found 
under “U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan”, updated 
October 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ 
taiwanarms (accessed 5 August 2014). 
103  See Point 9 in The White House, Office of the Press Sec-
retary, “U.S.-China Joint Statement”, 19 January 2011, http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-
joint-statement (accessed 12 August 2014). 
104  For details see Carlyle A. Thayer, “Enhancing Transpar-
ency? U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts and Dialogues”, 
Paper held at the 6th Berlin Conference on Asian Security, 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 18/19 June 2012, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
projekt_papiere/BCAS2012_Carlyle_Thayer_web_final_ks.pdf 
(accessed 12 August 2014). 
105  See “China, U.S. to Launch Strategic Security Dialogue”, 
Xinhua English News, 6 May 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english2010/china/2011-05/06/c_13862137.htm (accessed 12 
August 2014); Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “US-
China Relations: Creating a New Type of Major Power Rela-
tions”, Comparative Connections, September 2012, http://csis.org/ 
files/publication/1202qus_china.pdf (accessed 5 September 
2013). 
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the remaining branches of the military services could 
follow.106 
Though Chinese media frequently voice criticism 
of military exercises taking place in the Asia-Pacific 
region under US command, Beijing has been accepting 
Thailand’s invitations to send observers to Cobra Gold 
since 2002.107 In 2014 China for the first time sent a 
small contingent to participate in the part of the exer-
cise dedicated to “humanitarian and civil assistance”.108 
Other firsts include China’s November 2013 partici-
pation in a US disaster relief exercise in Hawaii and 
its taking part in RIMPAC in the summer of 2014 (in 
which the Chinese contingent comprised a destroyer, 
a guided missile frigate, a supply vessel and the hos-
pital ship “Peace Ark”).109 
When Xi Jinping and Barack Obama met at the 
APEC summit in November 2014, they signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding on Air and Maritime En-
counters – a document that according to first analyses 
leaves some key questions open.110 
Despite these increased activities and positive 
signals, China’s military leaders cite “three obstacles” 
standing in the way of better military-to-military con-
tacts between the two countries: US weapons deliv-
eries to Taiwan, reconnaissance operations conducted 
 
106  “China and US Slowly Building Trust between Mili-
taries”, South China Morning Post, 3 March 2014. 
107  See Minnie Chan and Darren Wee, “Chinese Troops 
Join US-Thailand Cobra Gold Military Exercises”, South China 
Morning Post, 12 February 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/ 
china/article/1425918/chinese-troops-join-asia-us-drills-
positive-step-amid-regional-tensions (accessed 17 November 
2014). 
108  See Nicole Yeo, “China’s Participation in Cobra Gold 
2014: A Golden Opportunity for the United States?”, China-US 
Focus, 11 March 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-
policy/chinas-participation-in-cobra-gold-2014-a-golden-
opportunity-for-the-united-states/ (accessed 1 August 2014). 
109  See Karon Snowdon, “RIMPAC 2014: China Joins World’s 
Biggest Naval Exercise in Waters off Hawaii for First Time”, 
Australian Network News (online), 27 June 2014, http://www. 
abc.net.au/news/2014-06-27/rimpac-china/5554904 (accessed 
1 August 2014). Nevertheless, China also sent a vessel to 
monitor RIMPAC. See Zachary Keck, “US Welcomes China’s 
RIMPAC Spying”, The Diplomat, 30 July 2014, http://thediplomat. 
com/2014/07/us-welcomes-chinas-rimpac-spying/ (accessed 
18 August 2014). 
110  See Mark J. Valencia, “The US-China MOU on Air and 
Maritime Encounters”, The Diplomat, 17 November 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-us-china-mou-on-air-and-
maritime-encounters/ (accessed 18 November 2014). Full text 
of the memorandum of understanding: http://www.defense. 
gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegarding 
Rules.pdf (accessed 18 November 2014). 
by US ships and aircraft in China’s vicinity, and legal 
restrictions on such contacts imposed by the US Con-
gress.111 
The intensification of military exchange has cer-
tainly not been able to dispel the mutual “strategic 
distrust”. Chinese politicians, military officials and 
researchers remain convinced that the US is pursuing 
a policy of containment towards China and enabling 
those regional countries with whom the US maintains 
military alliances to adopt a less pliant stance vis-à-vis 
China. Washington, for its part, assumes that the mid 
to long-term goal of China’s military modernization 
is to impede US access to the Asia-Pacific region and to 
challenge its dominance in the Western Pacific. 
 
 
 
111  See Karen Parrish, “Dempsey Urges More Strategic 
Dialogue between China, U.S.”, U.S. Department of Defense News, 
22 April 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. 
aspx?id=119839 (accessed 12 August 2014). 
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Bilateralism (plus): The Role of the Europeans 
 
European countries and the EU play a marginal role in 
the security arrangements outlined above. There are, 
however, security dialogues and cooperation – mainly 
on the part of France, the UK, Germany and, increas-
ingly, the EU itself – with several East Asian countries. 
In addition, Paris and London continue to maintain 
small military contingents in the region. France has 
military and civilian staff (approximately 2,500 per-
sonnel) stationed in the Southern Pacific.112 The UK 
maintains – since the devolution of Hong Kong to 
China in 1997 – only one garrison in Brunei with ap-
proximately 900 personnel, several helicopters and 
a training center, as well as a large fuel depot and 
shipping piers in Singapore.113 Furthermore, France 
and the UK, as well as Germany, maintain security 
dialogues and military exchange with various coun-
tries in the region such as Singapore and Australia. 
In his efforts to intensify security cooperation 
with other countries, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe has 
turned his attention also to Europe. In 2013/2014 
Japan initiated closer cooperation with the UK as well 
as with France. Tokyo and London signed a framework 
agreement on defense cooperation (UK-Japan Defence 
Equipment Cooperation Framework) and an agree-
ment on information security.114 In January 2014 
Japan hosted the first Japan-France 2+2 meeting be-
tween the two countries’ foreign and defense minis-
ters, in which defense cooperation was discussed, 
among other issues.115 Abe is also making an effort 
 
112  See Ministère de la Défense, France and Security in the 
Asia-Pacific [November 2013], 10, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ 
content/download/261113/3194598/file/PlaquetteAsie 
Pacifique2014ENDB.pdf (accessed 14 November 2014). 
113  See Sir Humphrey, “On Strategy – East of East of Suez, 
the UK Military Presence in the Asia Pacific Region”, THINK-
Defence (online), 25 June 2012, http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/ 
2012/06/east-of-east-of-suez-the-uk-military-presence-in-the-
asia-pacific-region/ (accessed 14 November 2014). The garrison 
in Brunei is financed by the Sultanate. 
114  See GOV.UK, “Foreign Secretary Signs Groundbreaking 
Defence and Security Agreements with Japan”, 4 July 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-signs-
groundbreaking-defence-and-security-agreements-with-japan 
(accessed 12 November 2014). 
115  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-France Foreign 
and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Overview of the Results)”, 
to intensify contacts with NATO (for more on this 
point see the next section, p. 26 et seq.). 
But EU member states also conduct regular military 
exchange with China116 – the arms embargo in place 
since 1989 has had no noticeable effect on relations. 
At their intergovernmental consultations in October 
2014 Germany and China signed a “Framework for 
Action”. The following areas of security cooperation 
are identified: bilateral coordination in the framework 
of European-Chinese defense cooperation; cooperation 
in UN peace missions; training, logistical and humani-
tarian assistance; anti-piracy operations; practical law 
enforcement cooperation in the fight against cross-
border crime and illegal immigration; counter-terror-
ism; and cyber security.117 
At the EU level, then High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Lady 
Ashton initiated a dialogue with China on defense and 
security, meeting former Chinese defense minister 
General Liang Guanglie in Beijing in July 2012 to dis-
cuss crisis management and the fight against piracy. 
At the meeting, the two sides pledged to further devel-
op their cooperation in the area of defense. Both sides 
want to sound out the possibilities of joint training 
and promote meetings between Chinese and European 
officers.118 The first EU-China dialogue on security and 
defense was held in October 2014, headed by the chair-
 
16 January 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/fr/page18e_ 
000049.html (accessed 12 November 2014). 
116  See Christian Le Mière, “Enhancing Transparency: 
Military to Military Cooperation and Strategic Dialogues”, 
Paper presented at the 6th Berlin Conference on Asian Secu-
rity, 18/19 June 2012, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
contents/products/projekt_papiere/BCAS2012_Christian_ 
LeMierel_web_final_ks.pdf (accessed 19 August 2014). 
117  See Press and Information Office of the Federal Govern-
ment, Aktionsrahmen für die deutsch-chinesische Zusammenarbeit: 
“Innovation gemeinsam gestalten!”, 10 October 2014, 4, http:// 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/10/ 
2014-10-10-aktionsrahmen-dt-chin.pdf (accessed 13 November 
2014). 
118  Daniel Fiott, “China and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy”, European Geostrategy, 28 November 2013, 
http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2013/11/china-csdp/ 
(accessed 19 August 2014). 
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man of the EU Military Committee.119 China already 
cooperates with the UN-mandated and EU-led anti-
piracy mission Atalanta off the coast of Somalia; 
this serves as a concrete starting point for further 
exchange. 
In May 2014 the EU and South Korea signed a 
Framework Participation Agreement, thus making 
Seoul the first EU security partner in the region. Once 
it is ratified, the agreement will enable the country to 
participate in CSDP missions.120 A similar partnership 
was established with Australia in April 2015.121 Other 
countries in the region could follow this example. 
In general, military and security exchange between 
the EU or European countries and Asian partners 
serves mainly to build trust. The thematic focus is 
almost entirely on non-traditional security coopera-
tion – such as disaster relief and the fight against 
piracy and, more recently, cyber security. 
In one way, however, EU member states also have 
an effect on the “hard” security situation in the region. 
Together, they constitute the largest weapons supplier 
for maritime Southeast Asia122 – an inexplicable situa-
tion given the seven refusal criteria listed in the Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports, a “Common Positition” 
of the EU on arms transfers to countries outside the 
EU.123 Coordination among European weapons export-
ers is negligible; the exports are governed by eco-
nomic, not security considerations.124 
 
119  See “EU, China to Hold First Dialogue on Security, 
Defence”, China Daily (online), 9 October 2014, http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-10/09/content_18711938.htm 
(accessed 13 November 2014). 
120  See Pierre Minard and Eva Pejsova, “CSDP’s New Part-
ners: East Asia”, EUISS Issue Alert 39 (September 2014), http:// 
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_39_CSDP_partners_ 
in_East_Asia.pdf (accessed 10 November 2014). 
121  See Pierre Minard, “Partners from a Large Island: Australia 
and CSDP”, EUISS Issue Alert 24 (April 2015), http://www.iss. 
europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_24_Australia_CSDP.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2015). 
122  See Oliver Bräuner, “Rüstungstransfers ins maritime 
Südostasien”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 64, no. 40/41 (2014): 
22–27. 
123  The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was first decided by 
the Council in 1998. In 2008, it was elevated to a “Common 
Position”. This does not make it legally binding, but political-
ly stronger. Full text of the document: “Council Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 Defining Com-
mon Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Tech-
nology and Equipment”, Official Journal of the European Union 
51, no. L 335 (2008): 99–103. 
124  See Bräuner, “Rüstungstransfers ins maritime Südost-
asien” (see note 122): 27. 
NATO Partnerships in East Asia 
For those EU member states that belong to NATO, 
there is another connection to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Since the end of the 1990s, the alliance has also main-
tained a range of partnerships in the region. In the 
2000s, exchange intensified with those partners that 
cooperated with NATO in the context of the ISAF 
mission. The partners were initially designated “con-
tact countries”; later, at the 2008 NATO summit, they 
were called “partners Across the Globe”. NATO has 
published tailor-made cooperation programs to this 
end (“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Pro-
grammes”, IPCP).125 Such individual relationships 
exist with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South 
Korea, as well as with Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Mongolia.126 
The end of the ISAF mission in 2014 marked the 
end of NATO’s coordination of external partners, but 
cooperative relationships continue to exist through 
the individual IPCPs. Australia, South Korea and Japan 
(as well as China) participate in the anti-piracy mission 
in the Gulf of Aden. NATO cooperation with Asian-
Pacific countries applies – similar to those of the EU – 
mainly to non-traditional security sectors. 
In April 2013 then NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasumssen made the first official NATO visit to 
Korea. During his subsequent stay in Tokyo, a joint 
political declaration between NATO and Japan was 
signed.127 A few months earlier, in January 2013, Prime 
Minister Abe had called on NATO in a letter to play 
a more active role in East Asia and drew attention 
to China’s growing naval power and North Korea’s 
behavior.128 Although the joint declaration empha-
sized common strategic interests and values, China 
received no mention. The Secretary General officially 
underscored that China was not perceived as a threat 
and called for increased dialogue.129 
 
125  See Miha Hribernik, “The Path Ahead for NATO Partner-
ships in the Asia-Pacific”, Atlantic Voices 3, no. 8 (2013): 2–9. 
126  See the survey “NATO’s Relations with Partners across 
the Globe”, 31 March 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_49188.htm (accessed 14 November 2014). 
127  Full text: “Joint Political Declaration between Japan 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 12 April 2013, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0552C2C0-9D1E17A8/natolive/ 
official_texts_99562.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 14 No-
vember 2014). 
128  See Hribernik, “The Path Ahead” (see note 125): 6. 
129  See “NATO Hopes to Strengthen Dialogue with China: 
NATO Chief”, Xinhua News, 17 September 2011, http://news. 
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In fact, since 2002 there have been several contacts 
between NATO and China. But the Atlantic alliance is 
seen by the Chinese side as an instrument of the US; 
the reservations regarding closer exchange are there-
fore substantial. In other countries of the region, too, 
attempts to strengthen NATO’s role could meet with 
refusal.130 The EU, in contrast, is less handicapped in 
this regard, and countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
are therefore more willing to engage in dialogue. 
 
 
 
xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-09/17/c_131143960. 
htm; Hribernik, “The Path Ahead” (see note 125): 7. 
130  See Benjamin Schreer, “NATO’s Partnerships: Asia 
Pacific”, Statement prepared for the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, Defence and Security Committee (DSC), 57th 
Annual Session, Prague, 11 November 2012, 3, http://www. 
google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=
4&ved=0CDcQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nato-pa.int 
%2FDocdownload.asp%3FID%3D1BFFAD049306000402E0&ei=
dBxmVLLrLMzsO5bTgOAM&usg=AFQjCNFSh4cQJ5u-hRsdGehr 
HsrnbeKC-w (accessed 14 November 2014). 
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Regional Security Organizations and Forums 
 
The US and China in the 
Regional Organizations 
At the center of most of the organizations and forums 
in East Asia that deal exclusively or partially with 
security issues is the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, ASEAN. This organization has dedicated itself 
to becoming a community built on the three pillars 
of economics, society/culture and politics/security.131 
Some of the regional forums deal with a broad 
agenda (such as the East Asia Summit – EAS); others 
specifically address security issues (ASEAN Regional 
Forum – ARF; ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting plus – 
ADMM+; Extended ASEAN Maritime Forum – EAMF).132 
The forums have often been criticized for their failure 
to take binding decisions and their notorious tendency 
to fall short of their own goals. But they have proved 
quite robust and at least provide a platform for regu-
lar meetings and exchange. Both the US and China 
are active in the various regional organizations and 
forums. 
For the US, its own alliances and alliance-like part-
nerships have always been at the forefront of security 
cooperation. Although the US participates in the 
regional formats, it does not attach great importance 
to them due to their non-binding nature. Among the 
regional organizations, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), with its focus on economic and 
trade cooperation, was at the top of Washington’s list 
for many years. Not until Obama’s assumption of the 
presidency did the US renew its multilateral engage-
ment in the region.133 Then Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton paid the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta a visit 
 
131  See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an 
ASEAN Community (2009–2015), Jakarta, April 2009, http://www. 
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/east_asia/dl/ASEANblueprint. 
pdf (accessed 12 August 2014). 
132  On the multitude of regional organizations, forums and 
formats and their respective content emphasis see Table 2 in 
the Appendix, p. 38 et seq. 
133  For a detailed analysis of US relations with ASEAN see 
Thomas Lum et al., United States Relations with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), CRS Reports for Congress 
R40933 (Washington, D.C., 16 November 2009), http://fpc. 
state.gov/documents/organization/133919.pdf (accessed 
23 November 2014). 
during her first official trip to Asia in 2009. In the same 
year the US acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC),134 thereby taking a crucial step 
towards membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS). In 
November 2009 the first ever US-ASEAN summit took 
place.135 
Thus, the “pivot to Asia” announced by Obama has 
also implied a stronger US presence in the multilater-
al formats of the region. But despite the renewed inter-
est in organizations such as ARF, EAS and ADMM+, 
Washington remains skeptical about their effective-
ness – above all because cooperation within the frame-
work of such mechanisms is restricted to “soft” 
security areas.136 
Obama had announced his intention to attend the 
EAS summits in person. But in October 2013 he had to 
cancel his participation in both the APEC summit and 
EAS due to the government shutdown in the US at the 
time. His absence must have nourished doubts in the 
region as to how durable and reliable the US rebalanc-
ing would be. At the summits in November 2014 (first 
the APEC in Beijing, then the EAS in Myanmar), 
Obama was again present. 
China has been participating in the regional forums 
consistently since the mid-1990s. It acceded to the ARF 
in the same year of its founding, 1994. From the very 
beginning, Beijing was also part of the ASEAN+3 for-
mat which was formed in 1997 in response to the Asian 
financial crisis. And China was the first non-Southeast 
Asian country to sign the friendship treaty of the 
ASEAN member states (TAC), in late 2003.137 Further-
 
134  See, e.g., John J. Brandon, “ASEAN Summit Promises 
First-Ever Full U.S. Engagement”, In Asia (online), 11 Novem-
ber 2009, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2009/11/11/asean-
summit-promises-first-ever-full-u-s-engagement/ (accessed 
13 November 2014). 
135  See Ernest Z. Bower, “U.S.-ASEAN Summit: President 
Obama Engages Southeast Asia”, 9 November 2009, http:// 
csis.org/publication/us-asean-summit-president-obama-
engages-southeast-asia (accessed 13 November 2014). 
136  Brad Glosserman, “The U.S. Rebalance, Multilateralism 
and the Dilemma of Asia Pacific Security”, in Strategic Engage-
ment in the Asia Pacific, ed. by Teo and Ali (see note 65), 5 et seq. (6). 
137  See Lyall Breckon, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: A 
New Strategic Partnership Is Declared”, Comparative Connec-
tions (CSIS) 5, no. 4 (2004), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/ 
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29 
more, Beijing functioned as co-initiator and host of 
the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear weap-
ons program, which began in 2003. But China has not 
always been able to push through its ideas regarding 
membership in regional organizations. For example, 
China had favored the ASEAN+3 (namely ASEAN plus 
China, Japan and South Korea) constellation as the core 
of the EAS at its inception but finally had to accept its 
expansion to include the three additional (democratic) 
countries India, Australia and New Zealand – which 
was supported by Japan, among others.138 
In the past, China has largely failed to constructive-
ly shape the agenda of the regional organizations. 
Beijing has generally worked to keep “hard” security 
issues and current conflicts off the agenda. And despite 
China’s continuous involvement, Beijing invariably 
stresses that the regional organizations are not a suit-
able forum for resolving territorial disputes.139 
On the other hand, China makes use of those forums 
in which the US is either not represented at all or not 
“adequately”. In 2014 China’s leadership hosted the 
“Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
in Asia” (CICA), which had been initiated in the early 
1990s by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakh-
stan. Until recently this format – which brings to-
gether 23 countries from South Korea to Iran to Egypt, 
but not the US140 – existed on the fringes. But the 
speech that Xi Jinping gave at the meeting in Shang-
hai made international headlines. He declared that 
security and peace in Asia could and should be safe-
 
pubs/0304qchina_seasia.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014). 
138  See, e.g., Mohan Malik, China and the East Asian Summit: 
More Discord Than Accord (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, February 2006), http://www.apcss.org/ 
Publications/APSSS/ChinaandEastAsiaSummit.pdf (accessed 
18 August 2014); Chien-peng Chung, “China and Japan in 
‘ASEAN Plus’ Multilateral Arrangements: Raining on the 
Other Guy’s Parade”, Asian Survey 53, no. 5 (2013): 801–24 
(812 et seq.). 
139  See, e.g., “ADMM-Plus Not Appropriate Forum for Resolv-
ing Maritime Disputes”, Global Times, 28 August 2013; Ding 
Gang, “China Can Help Guide Critical COC Talks”, Global 
Times, 28 August 2013. 
140  Members are Afghanistan, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
China, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, 
Russia, South Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan, 
United Arab Emirates and Vietnam. There are nine observer 
countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan, Qatar, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, US) and three international 
organizations (United Nations, OSCE und Arab League). 
guarded by the Asian countries themselves141 – a 
thinly veiled criticism of US military presence and 
US alliances in the region. It is doubtful, however, 
whether China’s initiative will be able to transform 
CICA into an organization with the power to act and 
take regional security into its own hands. For one, 
central actors such as Japan are either not present or 
are relegated to observer status; second, the member 
states constitute a very heterogeneous mixture, both 
geographically and in terms of interests. 
Although traditional security issues are not on the 
agenda of the ASEAN-plus forums, the issue of Chinese 
territorial claims has been addressed there regularly 
since 2010 – by the US but also by the Philippines and 
Vietnam. These forums were often the scene of heated 
exchanges – usually between China and the US. At the 
assembly of the ARF in summer 2010 in Hanoi, the 
Chinese foreign minister left the room following then 
Secretary of State Clinton’s statement that freedom 
of navigation in the South China Sea constituted a 
“national interest” of the US. In 2012 the ASEAN for-
eign ministers meeting ended without a joint com-
muniqué for the first time because Cambodia, which 
chaired the meeting, refused to include the positions 
of Vietnam and the Philippines on the South China 
Sea in the document. 
Time after time, such verbal clashes are triggered 
by simmering maritime and territorial disputes as 
well as by Beijing’s perception that the US and its 
allies intend to form a coalition against China to pre-
vent its rise. Regarding the disputes in the South 
China Sea, China remains opposed to any internation-
alization in resolving the conflict as well as to any 
regionalization in the framework of ASEAN or ARF – 
although it has signed respective international treaties 
(UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea) or agreements (TAC, Declaration on the Con-
duct of Parties in the South China Sea). At an ASEAN 
meeting in August 2014, China’s Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi proposed a “dual track” approach, whereby 
all South China Sea rim countries should jointly main-
tain peace and stability, while conflicts were addressed 
through bilateral negotiations between partners.142 
 
141  See “President Xi Addresses CICA Summit”, Xinhua News, 
21 May 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/china-news/ 
president-xi-addresses-cica-summit/ (accessed 28 September 
2014). 
142  “China Supports ‘Dual-track’ Approach to Resolve 
Dispute”, China Daily (online), 10 August 2014, http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/10/content_18280181.htm 
(accessed 9 September 2014). 
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Wang Yi’s proposal merely reaffirms the long-held 
Chinese position. 
As partners of ASEAN, the US, Japan, Australia, 
India and – to the extent that it is represented – the 
EU all have an interest in the organizations finding 
a common position on the territorial issues and nego-
tiating a robust Code of Conduct for the South China 
Sea. By supporting such efforts by ASEAN as a com-
munity, the above-mentioned actors hope to prevent 
China from isolating individual members of the orga-
nization by using a “divide et impera” tactic. 
Effectiveness and Limitations of the 
Regional Formats 
The regional organizations in Asia are often referred 
to –first and foremost in Western publications – as 
“talkshops” in which nothing is really decided. The 
principles of consensus and non-intervention, in 
particular, are cited as the primary obstacles to the 
effectiveness of the formats. However, as mentioned 
previously, the restriction to non-sensitive security 
issues as well as the lack of coordination and division 
of labor among the individual forums also play a role. 
Here the term “patchwork regionalism” remains apt. 
In effect, the same is true for all the above-mentioned 
formats. They may be important for defense coopera-
tion in Asia, but their effectiveness is questionable for 
several reasons: the “strategic distrust” in the region 
and the tensions resulting from territorial disputes; 
the lack of political will to expand cooperation to sen-
sitive issues (i.e. those affecting questions of national 
sovereignty); and the lack of resources necessary to 
guarantee regional security.143 
With the exception of the Six-Party Talks on North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, all the security 
forums have almost exclusively non-traditional risks 
on their agenda. Many observers, including those 
in the region, believe that sooner or later one of the 
organizations is going to have to address traditional 
security issues.144 
With regard to “classical” security problems, the 
activities of the regional organizations have so far 
been limited to conflict management; there are very 
 
143  See See Seng Tan, “Asia’s Growing Defense Engage-
ments”, in Strategic Engagement in the Asia Pacific, ed. by Teo and 
Ali (see note 65), p. 3. The assessment made here refers only 
to ADMM+, but in reality it applies to all formats. 
144  See, e.g., Muthiah Alagappa, “Building Peace and Securi-
ty in the Asia-Pacific”, PacNet no. 85 (2 December 2013). 
few discernable approaches or strategies aimed at con-
flict prevention, let alone conflict resolution. But the 
focus on non-traditional security issues in ARF and 
ADMM+ at least facilitates long-term communication, 
exchange and cooperation. And the issues of territori-
al and sovereignty claims continue to crop up in the 
debates of the regional meetings, as outlined above. 
The lack of delimitation and the topical overlays 
that exist – for example between ARF and ADMM+ – 
are increasingly being discussed in the region itself. 
The question of how the forums can better coordinate 
their respective functions is an issue being debated. 
Another is whether one of them may be obsolete. At 
least to the security experts of the region (if not to the 
politicians), it is clear that this issue is urgent. In light 
of the intensified strategic competition between China 
and the US (and between China and Japan), the CSCAP 
Track 2 forum issued a memorandum in 2014 that 
puts forward a series of proposals aimed at improving 
coordination among the various mechanisms (with 
respect to ASEAN, ARF, EAS, ADMM+ and EAMF).145 
While a clearer delimitation of tasks and a better 
division of labor seem achievable, in the medium term 
it does not seem likely that one of the regional for-
mats will prevail over the others, i.e. replace them. On 
the contrary, the co-existence and cooperation among 
formats is largely perceived as adequate – in a region 
that is characterized by extremely divergent political 
systems and development levels as well as diverse 
cultural and religious traditions. 
One positive side-effect of the many multilateral 
forums that should not be neglected is that – be they 
formal like ARF or informal like the Shangri-La Dia-
logue – they provide opportunities for bilateral meet-
ings in the margins, and this often despite a difficult 
political climate between the respective partners. This 
was the case when Japan’s foreign minister met with 
his Chinese counterpart at the ARF in Myanmar in 
August 2014 (a first after Abe’s assumption of office 
in 2012), and also with the South Korean foreign 
minister.146 
 
145  See Towards an Effective Regional Security Architecture for the 
Asia Pacific. A Memorandum of the Council for Cooperation and Secu-
rity in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), June 2014, http://www.cscap.org/ 
uploads/docs/Memorandums/CSCAP%20Memorandum%20 
No.26%20-%20Towards%20an%20Effective%20Regional%20 
Security%20Architecture%20for%20the%20AP.pdf (accessed 
18 August 2014). 
146  See Rajaram Panda, “ARF Summit Meeting at Naypyidaw: 
An Assessment”, IPRIS Viewpoints, 151 (August 2014), 4. 
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Nevertheless, the significant increase in bilateral 
and trilateral security cooperation in parallel and 
apart from the regional organizations is a clear sign 
that many countries in the region do not consider 
them sufficient guarantors of security.147 Out of this 
arise two questions regarding the spread of bilateral 
and minilateral forms of security cooperation – first, 
whether and how these formats can actually contrib-
ute to maintaining peace in the region; and second, 
whether and how they affect the regional forums. If 
more and more countries seek refuge outside of the 
organizations, it could become even more difficult to 
come to an agreement on improving the coordination 
and effectiveness of the organizations. 
 
 
 
147  See, e.g., Rory Medcalf, “Shinzo Abe’s Strategic Dia-
mond”, The Diplomat, 15 January 2013. Medcalf writes of the 
increase in bilateral and trilateral security cooperation: 
“This has been a growth industry in Asia over the past decade, 
driven partly by frustrations with the slow pace of inclusive 
multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum.” 
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Regional Formats: The Role of the Europeans 
 
Peace and stability in East Asia are of paramount inter-
est to Europe, given the intensive trade and economic 
relations between the two regions. But European coun-
tries and the EU, as demonstrated, have thus far played 
no significant role in addressing the traditional secu-
rity problems in the Asia-Pacific region. Europe’s 
record is decidedly better when it comes to tackling 
the “soft” security issues148 – i.e. precisely the area 
focused on by the regional organizations. But this has 
not earned the EU the reputation of a serious security 
actor in the region. To some extent this is due (ironi-
cally) to a lack of military presence; it is also attribut-
able to the fact that the EU did not consistently send 
high-ranking representatives to the forums until 2012. 
From the very beginning, the EU was a member 
of the ARF (meetings of the foreign ministers). In 
addition, it engages in dialogue in the framework of 
ASEAN post-ministerial meetings. But the EU or Euro-
pean countries also maintain two independent for-
mats of their own with the region. First, since 1980 an 
EU-ASEAN meeting has been taking place every two 
years at the level of foreign ministers, complemented 
by dialogue formats. In 2012 an action plan was 
decided aimed at intensifying exchange between the 
two sides –including in the area of security.149 The 
envisaged areas of security cooperation announced in 
the plan are extensive, though it is unclear how much 
has actually been put into practice. In July 2014 the 
20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting issued a joint state-
ment identifying the priorities of future cooperation: 
 
148  See the list in Axel Berkofsky, “The European Union’s 
Involvement in Asian Security: Not Enough or Just about 
Right?”, Panorama (Insights into Asian and European Affairs) 2/ 
2014, Special Issue “Europe – Surging Ahead”: 21–33 (27 et 
seq.). Special attention is given here to Europe’s participation 
in stabilization measures in East Timor, Aceh, the Philippines 
(Mindanao) and Myanmar. 
149  Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU 
Enhanced Partnership (2013–2017), April 2012, http://www.asean. 
org/images/archive/document/BSB%20Plan%20of%20Action% 
20to%20Strengthen%20the%20ASEAN-EU%20Enhanced%20 
Partnership%202013-2017.pdf (accessed 19 August 2014). An 
overview of the dialogue formats between the EU and ASEAN 
from July 2014 can be found at: http://www.asean.org/news/ 
item/overview-of-asean-eu-dialogue-relations (accessed 19 
August 2014). 
enhancing cooperation in the area of maritime secu-
rity, doubling European fiscal support for the institu-
tional development of ASEAN, and upgrading bilateral 
relations to a strategic partnership.150 In addition, 
the EU will appoint an ambassador to ASEAN based in 
Jakarta (at the ASEAN secretariat). By taking this step, 
the EU fulfills a longstanding request of the Southeast 
Asian countries. 
Second, in 1996 Europe and Asia established the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), thus creating a counter-
part to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
The EU, its member states and other European coun-
tries participate in the ASEM summits. As in the other 
forums, the agenda is broad; security issues play only 
a minor role. In fact, of all the above-mentioned for-
mats in which the EU is represented, only the ARF 
deals specifically with security issues. 
At the annual Shangri-La Conference in Singapore – 
which is organized by the IISS, a British think tank – 
the UK and France regularly send high-level represent-
atives. Former EU High Representative Lady Ashton 
first travelled to the meeting in May 2013, where, 
accompanied by an EU military delegation, she spoke 
on the role of the European Union in Asian security 
issues.151 
The EU actively promotes regional integration in 
East Asia, financially supporting (as does Washington) 
the ASEAN secretariat, and it would like to become a 
member of the EAS. Though the EU fulfilled a central 
prerequisite by signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) in 2012 – the result of a six-year 
 
150  “Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting”, Brussels, 23 July 2014, 120723/03, http://eeas. 
europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140723_03_en.pdf (accessed 
10 November 2014). 
151  See “Europeans at Shangri-La Dialogue Achieve Woody 
Allen’s 80%”, Europe-Asia Security Forum, 7 June 2013, http:// 
euroasiasecurityforum.com/2013/06/07/europeans-at-shangri-
la-dialogue-achieve-woody-allens-80/ (accessed 22 August 
2013). The speech by Catherine Ashton can be found here: 
“Defending National Interests, Preventing Conflict”, Speech 
delivered by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 1 June 2013 (A 291/13), http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ 
EN/foraff/137368.pdf (accessed 19 August 2014). 
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long effort152 – the majority of ASEAN member states 
(still) do not seem to support the EU’s bid for admit-
tance. The reason often given is that the accession of 
the US and Russia in 2011 must first be “digested”. At 
the same time, however – and this is arguably an even 
more important reason –, the EU itself has in fact not 
consistently demonstrated that it attaches importance 
to participation in regional forums. 
In 2012 EU, represented by then High Representa-
tive Lady Ashton, was present at both the ASEAN post-
ministerial meeting and the ARF in Phnom Penh, a 
move which can be seen as a reaction to criticism 
expressed in the region. In the following two years, 
Ashton attended both meetings. Since the end of 2013, 
the EU has also resumed its participation in the CSCAP 
Track 2 format following several years of “suspended” 
membership.153 The EU has thus taken a series of posi-
tive steps that should be continued under the new 
leadership team in Brussels. 
Cooperation with the US in the Region? 
The EU is confronted with the question of whether 
and to what extent it should stand shoulder to shoulder 
with the US in the field of security in Asia. There are 
certainly many common interests shared by the US 
and Europeans, such as the peaceful resolution of con-
flicts. 
In late 2005 the EU agreed on a document entitled 
“Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in 
East Asia”. This occurred in the wake of a 2003/2004 
debate in the EU over whether to lift the arms em-
bargo against China, an idea that was subsequently 
rejected. Originally the “Guidelines” were not made 
public; in the meantime, however, they have been 
 
152  The EU had applied to accede the TAC in late 2006. 
As the TAC does not provide for the admittance of regional 
organizations, it first had to be amended in an additional 
protocol (2010) that then came into force on 12 June 2012. 
See European Commission, “The EU Accedes to Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, Phnom Penh, 
12 July 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-781_ 
en.htm (accessed 19 August 2014). France joined the TAC in 
2011, followed by the United Kingdom in 2012. 
153  The European Union joined CSCAP in 1994 initially as an 
associated member and became a full member in 1998. Mem-
bership was subsequently suspended due to failure to pay 
membership dues. Since 2013 the EU is again a full-fledged 
member. On CSCAP-EU see: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies (EUISS), CSCAP-EU, http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
de/regionen/asien/cscap-eu/ (accessed 18 August 2014). 
revised twice (2007, 2012) and also published. From 
the first version on, it was explicitly stated in this 
document that the EU takes the role and interests of 
the US and its regional alliance partners into consid-
eration when taking actions in the Asia-Pacific region: 
“The US’s security commitments to Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan as well as certain 
ASEAN countries, and the associated presence of US 
forces in the region, give the US a distinct perspec-
tive on the region’s security challenges, and makes 
the US an important contributor to regional stabil-
ity. It is important that the EU remains sensitive to 
this. Given the great importance of transatlantic 
relations, the EU has a strong interest in partner-
ship and cooperation with the US on foreign and 
security policy challenges related to East Asia.”154 
At the ARF in Phnom Penh in the summer of 2012, 
then Secretary of State Clinton and Lady Ashton signed 
a joint declaration stating that the interests of the US 
and the EU in the Asia-Pacific region are to a large ex-
tent identical. At the same time, the two sides declared 
their willingness to cooperate in the region.155 The 
fact that Ashton used her first appearance at the ARF 
to seal such a document met with a mixed response, 
not only in Asia. Though one can surely debate the 
sense or nonsense of the declaration, so far there has 
been no follow-up. 
It is right and important for the EU and European 
countries to clearly identify what concrete interests 
they share with the US in the Asia-Pacific region, such 
as, for example, freedom of navigation. But the EU 
should also not hesitate to make clear the differences 
between US and European positions – for instance, in 
the case of UNCLOS, which has been signed and ratified 
by all the EU member states and the EU itself, while 
the US has yet to accede to the convention. At the same 
time, a mere commitment to “peace and stability” in 
the region is too abstract without some indication of 
what the EU intends and is capable to contribute in 
concrete terms. The alliances and other security co-
operation of the US are as unlikely to disappear as the 
 
154  Council of the European Union, Guidelines on the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, Brussels, 20 June 2012 
(11492/12), 8, http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_ 
foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
155  Joint EU-US Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region, Phnom 
Penh, 12 June 2012, A 328/12, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131709.pdf 
(accessed 19 August 2014). 
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regional organizations. And in East Asia the Europeans 
play an entirely different role than the US – their mili-
tary capabilities are extremely limited, and it can be 
safely presumed that their willingness to intervene 
militarily in the case of a conflict escalation is even 
more limited. 
Concerning relations with China, the EU and Ger-
many find themselves in a situation not entirely 
unlike that of the East Asian countries. There is little 
worry here in Europe that a rising China is a direct 
threat to our own security. Despite all the causes for 
complaint, China is an attractive economic partner 
for the EU – above all Germany – and is increasingly 
considered an important partner on global issues as 
well. Thus, it cannot be in the EU’s interest to be per-
ceived as part of US containment efforts. Nevertheless, 
the EU must respond to destabilizing events in the 
region and take a clear stance –as it did when China 
unilaterally declared an air defense identification 
zone above the East China Sea in November 2013.156 
Recommendations for the EU and Europe 
Within the EU (both the Union and member states), a 
discussion should take place regarding how one would 
react to a military conflict escalation in East Asia, even 
if such a crisis may be unlikely. To this end, it would 
be helpful to simulate the phases of a potential con-
flict – for instance in the South China Sea or in case 
of a confrontation between China and Japan – in sce-
narios or policy games. 
At the very least, the EU should demonstrate its 
continuous commitment to East Asia by ensuring that 
high-level EU representatives are regularly present at 
regional forums and summit meetings. It is also im-
portant to make offers of cooperation that are as con-
crete as possible. Strategy papers and action plans are 
worthless unless they are followed by deeds. There-
fore, if such documents are published, follow-up 
measures should also be planned, implemented and 
subsequently evaluated. The formats in which the EU 
is already engaged (ASEAN-EU, ARF, CSCAP) provide 
sufficient starting points for substantial cooperation. 
 
156  “Declaration by the High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the establish-
ment by China of an ‘East China Sea Air Defence Identifi-
cation Zone’”, 28 November 2013 (17082/1/13 REV 1), http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ 
EN/foraff/139752.pdf (accessed 18 November 2014). 
Increasingly, countries of the Asia-Pacific region 
bristle when the EU offers guidance or presents itself 
as a model for regional integration. Undoubtedly, the 
attractiveness of the EU has diminished – due to the 
euro crisis, the growth of Euro-skeptic groups and 
Europe’s current problems in dealing with crises in 
their immediate neighborhood (Ukraine, Syria/Iraq). 
Instead of referring to oneself as a model, it would 
be more useful to take up positive examples and best 
practices from the region in specialized seminars and 
practical training courses, including cases of success-
ful conflict resolution. Maritime security would lend 
itself as a suitable focal point. It involves both non-
traditional and traditional security, and an escalation 
of the territorial conflicts in the South and East China 
Seas would not only severely damage European eco-
nomic interests but also conflict with Europe’s con-
ception of regional and global order. 
Within the broad-ranging ASEM process, security 
issues can also be placed on the agenda, for example 
by organizing retreats for leading political figures, as 
was already done at the Milan ASEM summit in Octo-
ber 2014. It would also be useful to conduct a system-
atic inventory and evaluation of the security coopera-
tion already maintained by the EU and member states 
with individual Asian countries as well as in the frame-
work of ASEAN-EU and ARF. These European projects 
and activities should then be “marketed” better, i.e. 
made public to a greater extent. At the same time, 
maintaining relations at the highest level remains 
important. Here the new leadership team in Brussels 
should not allow any further time lapses, despite the 
crises in Europe’s neighborhood. 
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Appendix 
 
Abbreviations 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
ADMM+ ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting plus 
AMF ASEAN Maritime Forum 
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 
Treaty 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APT ASEAN Plus Three 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting 
ASPC ARF Security Policy Conference 
AUSMIN Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation 
CFC Combined Force Command 
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia 
COC Code of Conduct 
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Washington, D.C.) 
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
EAMF Extended ASEAN Maritime Forum 
EAS East Asia Summit 
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
FY Fiscal year 
HACGAM Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting 
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New 
Delhi) 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) 
IPCP Individual Partnership and Cooperation 
Programmes 
IPRIS Portuguese Institute of International Relations and 
Security (Lisbon) 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JIMEX Japan India Maritime Exercise 
LAC Line of Actual Control 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBR National Bureau of Asian Research  
(Washington, D.C.) 
NPCGF North Pacific Coast Guard Forum 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe 
PAMS Pacific Armies Managements Seminar 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) 
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific Exercise 
ROK Republic of Korea 
RSIS S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
SCC Security Consultative Committee 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDF Self-Defense Forces (Japan) 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
SFA Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer 
Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SSD Strategic Security Dialogue 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
TCS Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
TSD Trilateral Security Dialogue 
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
 
 
Further Reading 
Alexandra Sakaki 
Japan’s Security Policy.  
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Table 1: Key Data on US Alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia 
 US–Japan US–ROK (South Korea) US–Australia 
Institutional 
framework 
Peace Treaty and Security Treaty September 
1951; 
revised Security Treaty 19 Jan., 1960a and 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); 
US is granted facilities and areas in Japan 
for use of its land, air and naval forces 
Japan: individual self-defense  
(Art. 9 Constitution) 
Defense Treaty 1953b (also Korean Armistice 
Agreement); 
Protection of South Korea from the North 
September 1951: trilateral ANZUS Treaty 
(US-Australia-New Zealand); after 1986 
bilateral between the US and Australia and 
bilateral between Australia and New 
Zealandc 
 Guidelines 1978:d 
Response to Cold War tensions and possibility 
of a Soviet Invasion of Japan,e  
first guidelines on operational cooperation 
between Japan and US in case of a crisisf 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 1966g Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 1963h 
 Revised Guidelines 1997:i 
Response to the end of the Cold War, nuclear 
program of North Korea and Taiwan crisis; 
direct mutual support “in situations 
surrounding Japan” 
Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United 
States of America and the Republic of Korea, 
June 2009;j 
US-ROK Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 
2010 
Australia-US Joint Statement of Principles on 
Interoperability, 2004 
 New Guidelines 2015:k 
Response to China‘s assertive international 
posture (especially maritime/territorial 
conflicts), to continuing North Korean 
provocations and to the growing threat of 
cyber attacks 
Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 
60th Anniversary of the Alliance between 
the Republic of Korea and the United States 
of America, May 2013;l 
Strategic Alliance 2015 
Defense Trade Treaty, 2007m 
Political formats  Security Consultative Meeting (defense 
ministers), since 1969 
 
  Military Committee Meeting, since 1979  
 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (2+2), 
from 1994n 
Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting 
(2+2), since 2010 
Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) (2+2), 
since 1985 (annually since 2008)o 
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Tables 
 US–Japan US–ROK (South Korea) US–Australia 
Military cooperation Joint command in Yokota for data exchange 
and coordination of air and missile defense, 
from 2006p 
Combined Forces Command1978;  
1994: peacetime operational control of 
South Korean forces transferred to ROK 
Joint Chiefs of Staff q 
 
 US nuclear umbrella  US nuclear umbrella US nuclear umbrella 
 joint training and exercises joint training and exercises joint training and exercises 
Troop deployment currently ca. 50,000: 
Navy ca. 19,500, Marines 15,500, Air Force 
ca. 20,500 
until 2004: 37,000, since 2008: 28,500r 
Army 19,000, Air Force 8,000 
ca. 200 Marines, 
announced in 2011: 2,500 Marines 
a  Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, http:// 
en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_
the_United_States_of_America (accessed 28 January 2015). 
b  Full text: Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 1 October 
1953, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp (accessed 12 February 2014). The 
Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty. 
c  Full text: Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America – ANZUS 
(San Francisco, 1 September 1951), Entry into force generally: 29 April 1952, http:// 
australianpolitics.com/topics/foreign-policy/anzus-treaty-text (accessed 15 August 2013). 
After 1986 the treaty was no longer trilateral, but applied separately between Australia and 
the US on the one hand and between Australia and New Zealand on the other hand, since 
New Zealand banned port calls of nuclear armed ships of the U.S in 1985. 
d  Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, 27 November 1978, http://www.fas.org/news/ 
japan/sisin1e.htm (accessed 28 January 2015). 
e  “Talks start with US on new defense plan. Greater SDF role sought as China grows more 
assertive”, in: Japan Times, 18 January 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/18/ 
national/politics-diplomacy/talks-start-with-u-s-on-new-defense-plan/#.VCAuXGNQRxI 
(accessed 28 January 2015). 
f  Full text: http://project2049.net/documents/japan_us_defense_guidelines_takahashi.pdf. 
g  Full text: http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/130/US-ROKStatusofForcesAgreement_1966-
67.pdf. 
h  Full text: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1963/10.html. 
i  “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century”, 17 April 1996, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed 18 August 
2013); full text: of guidelines: “The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation”, 23 
September 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html 
(accessed 5 August 2014). 
j  Full text: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-
United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea (accessed 28 January 2015). 
k    Full text: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_ 
DEFENSE_COOPERATION_FINAL&CLEAN.pdf (accessed 8 May 2015). 
l  Full text: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/joint-declaration-
commemoration-60th-anniversary-alliance-between-republ (accessed 28 January 2015). 
m  Full text: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2013/17.html (accessed 
28 January 2015). 
n  Full text: http://fas.org/news/japan/33690492-33695664.htm (accessed 28 January 2015). 
o  Joint declarations of these meetings: Australian Government, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, “Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations”, http://www.dfat.gov. 
au/geo/us/ausmin/ (accessed 28 January 2015). 
p  Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, The US-Japan Alliance (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, 12 December 2013), 13, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf. 
q  A joint (bi-national) command (Combined Force Command, CFC) was established in 1978 
commanded by a US general. In 1994 operational control of South Korean military in 
peacetime was transferred to the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff; wartime control 
remained under US command. In 2007 it was agreed between the US and the ROK to dis-
solve the CFC and transfer operational control completely to South Korea by 2012. How-
ever, this step has been postponed due to the sustained military threat from North Korea 
and domestic debates in South Korea. Cf. Shelley Su, “The OPCON Transfer Debate”, in US-
Korean 2001 Yearbook, ed. US-Korean Institute at SAIS (2012): 159–74, http://uskoreainstitute. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Su_YB2011.pdf (accessed 11 February 2014). 
r  Ashley Rowland, “Fewer Bases, Same Number of Troops in South Korea, US Ambassador 
Says”, in: Stars and Stripes, 15 February 2012. American troops are gradually transferred from 
the capital Seoul to the south of the country. 
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Table 2: Overview of Regional Organizations in East Asia 
Organisation 
1. ASEAN-centered 
Founded Members Enlargement Focus and formats 
ASEAN 1967 originally Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand (= 5) 
Brunei (1984), Vietnam 
(1995), Laos, Myanmar (1997), 
Cambodia (1999) (+ 5 = 10) 
comprehensive agenda, 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 1976,a 
goal: community with the three pillars 
economy, society/culture, politics/securityb 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting 1977 10 ASEAN member states + 10 
dialogue partners (Australia, 
China, EU, India, Japan, Canada, 
New Zealand, Russia, South 
Korea, US) (= 20) 
 international economy and politics, trans-
national topics like organized crime, drug 
smuggling, human trafficking, environment 
and health; 
additional format: ASEAN+1 with every dia-
logue partner 
ASEAN-Regionalforum (ARF)c 1994 10 ASEAN member states + 10 
dialogue partners + Bangladesh, 
Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, 
Timor-Leste (= 27) 
 regional security, 
non-traditional security (disaster relief, 
confidence-building, preventive diplomacy), 
meeting of foreign ministers, 
meeting of representatives from defense minis-
tries (ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue, DOD), 
conferences on security policy (ARF Security 
Policy Conference, ASPC) 
ASEAN+3 (APT) 1997 10 ASEAN member states + 
China, Japan, South Korea 
 economy/finances, 
response to Asian financial crisis, Chiang-Mai-
Initiative 
Plus 3 2004 China, Japan, South Korea  separate summits since 2008, 
Tri-lateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) 2011,d 
political relations, global economy, disaster 
relief 
East Asia Summit (EAS) 2005 originally ASEAN + 3 + 3 
(Australia, India, New Zealand) 
2011: + Russia and US  comprehensive agenda,e 
priorities: environment and energy, education, 
finances, global health and pandemics, manag-
ing natural disasters, ASEAN connectivity 
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Tables 
Organisation 
1. ASEAN-centered 
Founded Members Enlargement Focus and formats 
ASEAN Defense Ministers  
Meeting (ADMM) 
2006 10 ASEAN member states  non-traditional security, 
meeting of defense ministers 
ADMM+ 2010 = EAS 2011 (ASEAN+8)  meeting of defense ministers, 
confidence building and capacity building 
(areas: counter-terrorism, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, maritime 
security, military medicine, peacekeeping; new: 
humanitarian mine action)f 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 2010 10 ASEAN member states  maritime cooperation 
(environment, illegal fishing, piracy, eco-
tourism, freedom of navigation), 
Track 1.5g 
Expanded AMF (EAMF) 2012 = EAS 2011 (ASEAN+8)  maritime cooperation (like AMF)h 
Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)i 
1993 ASEAN member states (minus 
Laos and Myanmar) + 8 + EU, 
Canada, Mongolia, North Korea, 
Papua New Guinea (= 21) + 
associated: Secretariat of the 
Pacific Island Forum 
 security topics, 
Track 2 (informal, experts), 
working groups on changing topics 
 
a  Full text of the treaty: http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-
southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3 (accessed 12 November 2014). 
b  Cf. ASEAN, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009–2015), Jakarta, April 2009, http://www. 
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/east_asia/dl/ASEANblueprint.pdf (accessed 12 August 2014). 
c  See ARF website: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org (accessed 11 December 2014). 
d  Website of the Secretariat: http://www.tcs-asia.org/dnb/main/index.php (accessed 12 
November 2014). 
e  “Chairman’s Statement of the 8th East Asia Summit”, 10 October 2013, Bandar Seri 
Begawan, Brunei, http://www.asean.org/images/archive/23rdASEANSummit/chairmans%20 
statement%20-%208th%20east%20asia%20summit%20-%20final.pdf (accessed 12 November 
2014). 
f  Cf. Seng Tan, “A Farewell to Grandiosity? Practical Cooperation and the ADMM-Plus”, 
PacNet, no. 65 (13 August 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1365.pdf (accessed 21 
August 2013); Michito Tsuruoka, “An Era of the ADMM-Plus? Unique Achievements and 
Challenges”, PacNet, Nr. 69 (5 September 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1369.pdf 
(accessed 28 January 2015). 
g  “Track 1” meetings are official talks between government representatives. “Track 2” 
meetings are informal exchanges mostly between persons from academic or religious 
circles or from non-government organizations. In “track 1.5” meetings, both groups come 
together for informal talks. 
h  “First ASEAN Maritime Forum Held in Surabaya”, Antara News (online), 31 July 2010, 
http://www. antaranews.com/en/news/1280584402/first-asean-maritime-forum-held-in-
surabaya (accessed 11 August 2014). 
i  Cf. CSCAP website: http://www.cscap.org. 
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2. Additional formats in East 
Asia 
Founded Members Enlargement Focus and formats 
Five Powers Defence 
Arrangementsa 
1971 Australia, UK, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore  
 joint military exercises, 
meeting of defense ministers 
Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)b 
1987 originally Australia, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Japan, Canada, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, US 
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
(“Chinese Taipei”) (1991); 
Mexico, Papua New Guinea 
(1993); Chile (1994); Peru, 
Russia, Vietnam (1998) (= 21) 
economy and trade 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)c 1996 originally 15 EU + 7 ASEAN  
+ China, Japan, South Korea  
+ EU Commission 
+ 13 EU member states  
+ 2 European countries  
+ 11 Asian states + ASEAN 
Secretariat 
comprehensive agenda 
North Pacific Coast Guard Forum 
(NPCGF)d 
2000 originally Japan, Russia, South 
Korea, US 
China, Canada cooperation of coast guards 
Shangri-La Dialoguee 2002 organized by IISS (London)  security 
Heads of Asian Coast Guard 
Agencies Meeting (HACGAM)f 
2004 ASEAN + 3 + Bangladesh, Hong 
Kong, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  
 cooperation of coast guards 
Six-Party Talks (6PT) 2004 both Koreas, China, Japan, 
Russia, US 
 ad hoc grouping, 
nuclear program of North Korea 
(no meeting after 2009) 
a  For details see Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements:  
The Quiet Achiever”, Security Challenges 3, no. 1 (2007): 79–96. 
b  Cf. APEC website: http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/History.aspx  
(accessed 12 November 2014). 
c  Cf. ASEM website: http://www.aseminfoboard.org (accessed 12 November 2014). 
d  Cf. Canadian Coast Guard, “North Pacific Coast Guard Forum”, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ 
e0007869 (accessed 20 August 2014). 
e  IISS, “About Shangri-La”, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue/about-
shangri-la (accessed 28 January 2015). 
f  Cf. Rajeev Sharma, “Policing the High Seas”, The Diplomat, 3 October 2012, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2012/10/policing-the-high-seas/ (accessed 20 August 2014). 
